Fisheries management and fisheries livelihoods in Iceland by Chambers, Catherine P.
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT AND FISHERIES LIVELIHOODS IN ICELAND
By
Catherine P. Chambers, B.S., M.S.
A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy 
in
Fisheries
University of Alaska Fairbanks 
August 2016
APPROVED:
Courtney Carothers, Committee Chair 
Keith Criddle, Committee Member 
Andrew Seitz, Committee Member 
GuQrun Helgadottir, Committee Member 
Franz Mueter, Chair
Graduate Program in Fisheries 
S. Bradley Moran, Dean
School o f  Fisheries and Ocean Sciences 
Michael Castellini,
Dean o f  the Graduate School
Abstract
This dissertation explores the long-term implications of Iceland’s nationwide Individual 
Transferrable Quota (ITQ) system on rural communities and small-boat fishing livelihoods 
drawing on two years of ethnographic research in Northwest Iceland, a nationwide mailed 
survey of small-boat fishermen, and the compilation of fisheries human dimension indicator 
data for the lumpfish fishery. Results from ethnographic interviews and participant 
observation show that while there is a wide range of complex political, social, and 
environmental changes affecting coastal communities, the changes brought on by the ITQ 
system are perceived to have been particularly significant. Survey results suggest that the 
majority of small-boat fishermen perceive the ITQ system as serving the goal of wealth 
accumulation over the goal of resource conservation. Survey respondents and interview 
informants report high cultural connections to fishing through family history, but express 
concern that future generations may be precluded from fisheries livelihoods due to the 
prohibitory cost of entry into the ITQ system. Furthermore, survey responses, ethnographic 
interviews, and indicator data suggest that non-ITQ fisheries like the lumpfish fishery and the 
strandveidar season do not serve as substantial platforms to support newcomers to fisheries. 
These non-ITQ fisheries can make individuals and communities more resilient by providing 
extra income and, at the same time, can offer social flexibility to access a fishery of cultural 
and historical value. However, survey and interview data also suggest that the strandveidar 
fishery has resulted in new rifts in communities as Icelandic society struggles with differing 
perceptions of equitable access to marine resources. Survey and interview data show how 
decision-making power lies in the hands of a few dominant interest groups, leaving small- 
boat fishermen and rural communities at a disadvantage with little power to meaningfully 
influence national politics. Finally, the compilation of human indicator data in the lumpfish 
fishery highlights concepts of multiple (social, economic, and biological) goals in fisheries 
management and the benefits of participatory governance structures. Conclusions from this 
dissertation underscore the complexity of fisheries systems and the important role equity 
plays in sustainable fisheries management and governance.
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General Introduction
Fisheries management and Iceland
The sustainable management of the world’s forest, marine, freshwater, and wildlife resources 
is necessary for human survival, health, and well-being. Many of the world’s marine fisheries 
are overfished or in serious decline (Worm et al. 2009) and are faced with other complex 
challenges such as climate change, pollution, political unrest, or territorial disputes, so the 
design of good management systems for fisheries has never been more crucial. Marine 
fisheries consist of myriad ever-changing ecological, social, economic, and political factors 
that can create complicated management scenarios (Symes 2006). While the foundation of a 
healthy fishery is a robust fish stock, there are other economic and social goals that are also 
important to consider in the design of management rules and structure (Jentoft and 
Chuenpagdee 2009; Anderson et al. 2015).
Fisheries provide employment, stability, and a cultural and historic identity for 
individuals and coastal communities all over the world (Kooiman and Centre for Maritime 
Research 2005). At the same time, biological or economic end-goals such as catch limits or 
restricted licensing can often overshadow social and cultural end-goals such as access, 
participation, and equity (Pascoe 2006; Symes 2006; Ommer et al. 2011; Urquhart et al.
2011). In particular, management scenarios that restrict fisheries access can severely impact 
rural communities that have limited alternative economic options (Lowe 2011; Himes- 
Cornell and Kasperski 2016) and cut off essential cultural and historical connections to 
fishing livelihoods and ways of life central to community and personal identity (Lowe and 
Carothers 2008). Furthermore, management schemes have the potential to create new power 
imbalances or deepen existing ones in communities or between fishermen and governing 
bodies, creating long-standing inequities that further alienate local people from marine 
resources (Eythorsson 2000; Carothers 2015).
The management of fisheries resources by restricting access to fishing through the 
privatization of the right to fish has grown in popularity around the world in recent decades 
(Gordon 1954; Christy 1996; Scott 1999; Costello et al. 2008). Privatized fisheries schemes, 
such as Individual Transferrable Quota (ITQ) systems, can support economic efficiency end- 
goals, but can fall short of social goals like equity and access. ITQ schemes can have 
particularly disproportionate negative impacts on coastal communities and fishing livelihoods. 
In general, fishing right ownership tends to accumulate in the hands of a small number of 
individuals and also migrates outside of fishing communities, which can lead to rural job loss
1
in both catching and processing sectors (Palsson and Helgason 1995; Batstone and Sharp 
1999; Skaptadottir 2000, 2007; Karlsdottir 2008; Knapp 2011; Olson 2011). Additionally, the 
consolidation generated by ITQs is often linked not only to local economic decline, but also 
to loss of individual and occupational well-being and changes in human-nature relationships 
(Palsson and Helgason 1995; Lowe and Carothers 2008). ITQ systems are also linked to 
conversations about the moral considerations of privatization (Bourassa and Strong 2000; 
Maurstad 2000; Holm and Nielsen 2007; McCormack 2007, 2010; Karlsdottir 2008; Memon 
and Cullen 1992), strained personal relationships in small communities (Palsson and 
Helgason 1995; Eythorsson 1996; St. Martin 2007; Carothers and Chambers 2012), and legal 
issues of human rights and indigenous claims (Batstone and Sharp 1999; Copes and Palsson 
2000; McCormack 2010; Carothers 2011; Einarsson 2011).
The isolated Atlantic island of Iceland is often hailed in the management literature as 
having one of the most sustainably managed fisheries in the world, and this fame is due 
largely to the adoption of a nation-wide ITQ system (Arnason 1995; Danielsson 1997; 
Arnason and Gissurson 1999; Arnason 2005; Hannesson 2005; Marchal et al. 2016).
Although Iceland’s nationwide ITQ system is over 30 years old, it remains a topic of public 
and political debate, particularly because of the continued effects on small-scale fisheries and 
communities (Palsson and Helgason 1995; Eythorsson 1996, 2000; Skaptadottir 2000, 2007; 
Benediktsson and Karlsdottir 2011; Einarsson 2011; Einarsson 2015; Kokorsch et al. 2015; 
MattMasson et al. 2015). At the same time, Iceland has a long-standing cultural, historical, 
and economic connection to marine fisheries (van den Hoonaard 1992; Hastrup 1985; 
Kristjansson 1985; Palsson 1991; Durrenberger and Palsson 2015), which makes it a suitable 
study site for this dissertation research.
All fisheries in Iceland are managed under the Ministry of Industry and Innovation. 
The Marine Research Institute (Hafrannsdknastofnun) gives official scientific advice for all 
species and fisheries, but final TAC decisions are set by the Minister of Industry and 
Innovation. The Directorate of Fisheries (Fiskistofa) supervises compliance with other 
regulations such as area closures and gear restrictions and general administration of the ITQ 
system and licensing. No discards are permitted in any fishery, and most catch from small 
boats is landed at designated “fish markets” that give real time landing and quota status 
updates to the Directorate of Fisheries and then sell the catch through a centralized daily 
national auction. In this highly centralized governance system, all management decisions are 
made with the TAC advice from the Marine Institute. There is a chance for unions
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representing various fisheries interest groups to lobby, but this is informal, infrequent, and 
often the different stakeholders are not given equal access to voice their concerns.
Approach and organization o f  the dissertation
Sustainable fisheries management is inherently reliant upon human social, economic, 
political, and legal systems; in other words, the focus of fisheries management is not fish, but 
people (Ostrom 1990). People are part of specific organizations and institutions with 
designated power to control the decision-making processes that formulate the specific rules 
and regulations to enact fisheries management goals. The arrangement of the people 
themselves in the decision-making process is referred to as governance (Jentoft and 
Chuenpagdee 2015). Sustainable fisheries are therefore predicated upon a flexible 
governance arrangement that can respond not only to changes in fish abundance, but also 
fluctuations in consumer demand, costs associated with fishing, and other social trends 
(Jentoft et al. 1998; Armitage et al. 2009; Omner et al. 2011). Co-management, adaptive 
management, adaptive co-management, stakeholder engagement, community-based resource 
management, and interactive governance are all forms of participatory governance that 
highlight the importance of flexibility and power-sharing in the fisheries decision-making 
process (Jentoft 2000; Kooiman and Centre for Maritime Research, 2005), and these 
governance arrangements can lead to stewardship and equitable fisheries management that 
supports the complex goals of fisheries resource management (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; 
Armitage et al. 2009, Cox et al. 2010; Gutierrez et al. 2011).
An important part of participatory governance is the inclusion of data from social 
sciences that can help to design, monitor, and evaluate fisheries management scenarios. After 
the call by geographers, anthropologists, political scientists, and other social scientists, social 
and cultural research in fisheries management governance has been increasingly included in 
formal governance processes (Jentoft et al. 1998; Symes 2006; Symes and Phillipson 2009; 
Ommer et al. 2011; Urquhart et al. 2011; Poe et al. 2014). Social science research can be 
particularly important in understanding small-scale fisheries and rural communities by 
highlighting the significance of cultural values in fisheries systems (Pinkerton 1989;
Chambers and Kokorsch in press).
The major goal of this dissertation is therefore to explore the impacts that specific 
management and governance structures can have on the individuals and communities that are 
so intimately linked to fisheries using methods and theories primarily from the social sciences. 
This study is based on a theoretical background from the field of political ecology, an
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interdisciplinary field that aims to address the political and economic forces that are linked to 
natural resource management (Robbins 2004). This theoretical approach describes the 
creation of new social conflicts and the further entrenchment of existing inequalities by 
providing a clear analysis of unequal power relationships and marginalized voices in social- 
ecological systems that is left out of apolitical framings of natural resource management 
(Greenberg and Park 1994; Robbins 2004; Biersack and Greenberg 2006; Zimmerer 2006). In 
fisheries, those who use a political ecology lens explore how overexploitation of a fishery 
resource is not an inevitable outcome due to self-maximizing or greedy individuals, but rather 
a complex relationship driven by global capitalistic processes and industrialization that have 
transformed fisheries in recent decades (Mansfield 2004). Similarly, imbalances in political 
power can differentially impact those in rural communities who do not have equal access to 
decision-making processes as those in urban communities (Holen 2004; Bavinck 2015), and 
can give greater legitimacy to scientific knowledge over local knowledge (Finlayson 1994; 
Palsson 1998; Jentoft 2000; Verelst 2013) and economic management goals over other social 
goals (St Martin 2007; Carothers 2010; Carothers 2015; H0st 2015).
Icelandic small-scale fisheries and rural communities are the central topic of focus 
because of their historical and cultural connections to and continued dependence on fisheries. 
First, Chapter 1 focuses on description and comparison of small-boat fishermen1 throughout 
Iceland to understand their current perceptions, attitudes and experiences in fishing and 
fisheries management. Chapter 2 then takes a more in-depth approach by focusing on the 
individuals in rural communities in Northwest Iceland to understand how different changes in 
communities, relations of power, and conflicts over access to fisheries resources affect 
fishing livelihoods. Finally, Chapter 3 uses an interdisciplinary approach to explore the 
themes of the dissertation at the level of an entire fishery. Using data from the social and 
natural sciences, this chapter highlights the interplay of social, economic, and biological 
management goals in the lumpfish fishery. The lumpfish fishery is a small-scale, seasonal 
fishery, and it is one of the only fisheries in Iceland not managed by ITQs, so it makes for an 
interesting interdisciplinary case study in fisheries management and governance.
1 In Icelandic, the term “fisherman” (sjdmadur) refers to both males and females, so this 
dissertation uses the English word “fisherman” in the same way.
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Chapter 1: Thirty years after privatization: A survey of Icelandic small-boat fishermen1
Abstract
Iceland’s nationwide privatized Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system is over thirty 
years old, but remains a topic of public and political debate, particularly because of the 
continued effects on small-scale fisheries. A national survey of small-boat fishermen was 
distributed to: 1) identify major defining characteristics of participants in ITQ and non-ITQ 
fisheries, 2) document and examine differences in satisfaction with fisheries management, 
and 3) evaluate the existing options for newcomers to participate in small-boat fisheries. 
Survey results indicate that Icelandic small-boat fishermen are engaged in multiple 
management systems within a wide range of boat sizes. Those who held quota were more 
satisfied with the current ITQ system compared to those who did not hold quota; however, 
nearly all fishermen were still critical of fisheries management in Iceland and the two major 
non-ITQ options of lumpfish and coastal fishing were not perceived to offer significant 
opportunity for entry-level fishermen. Dissatisfaction stemmed from the lack of decision­
making power, a distrust of scientific advice, and the perception that the ITQ system did not 
serve the purpose of protecting fisheries resources, but was rather oriented only toward 
economic goals. The dynamic nature of Icelandic small-boat fishing livelihoods and the 
pervasive negative attitudes thirty years after ITQ implementation demonstrate the need for 
culturally appropriate and equitable fisheries management schemes where success is 
measured in social as well as economic and biological terms.
1.1 Introduction
The privatization of access to marine resources represents a dramatic shift in the ways human 
societies have traditionally organized around marine resources. Under privatized fisheries, 
the right to fish, once governed by commons arrangements, becomes a limited and tradable 
commodity. The push for privatization of marine resources began in the early 1950s with the 
development of fisheries economics and bio-economic modeling [1, 2]. In this emerging view 
of fisheries, overcapitalization was a major problem that led to inefficiencies in the system as 
too much capital was used to catch fish, dissipating the potential aggregate wealth and 
potentially threatening the long-term viability of fish stocks. The primary justification behind
1 Chambers, C. and C. Carothers. Thirty years after privatization: A survey of Icelandic 
small-boat fishermen. In press in Marine Policy. 10.1016/j.marpol.2016.02.026
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the implementation of privatization schemes is therefore to reduce overcapitalization by 
making the right to fish a private commodity [3-8] so that less efficient fishermen sell out of 
the system, theoretically resulting in a more economically efficient fishery.
This framing of fisheries that puts economic efficiency as the primary goal can 
minimize other important social aspects of fisheries systems. In particular, small-scale fishing 
operations and rural coastal communities can be irreversibly and disproportionately impacted 
by the transformations generated by fisheries privatization schemes. For example, crew and 
boat owners lose jobs as increasing costs force small-boat owners to sell fishing rights [9], 
remaining crew receive less shares [10] or become wage laborers [11], women and migrant 
workers lose jobs when small-scale on-shore processing facilities close due to decreases in 
fish deliveries [12], local fishing practices and values become marginalized [13, 14] and 
existing social inequalities in rural communities can deepen, causing tension between those 
who hold fishing rights and those who do not [15].
As research exploring the social impacts of privatized fisheries continues to accrue 
[11, 16, 17], there is evidence that the logic behind privatization — that individuals are 
inherently self-interested profit-maximizers — does not apply to all small-scale fisheries. 
Individual private property mechanisms are based on a largely asocial view of how people 
organize around resources [18, 19], and small-scale fishermen are constrained by, and operate 
under, complex cultural, political, and historic aspects in addition to economic considerations 
[e.g. 20-23]. Fisheries can be a way to make only a small amount of money without the intent 
to increase production or build up status [24], a flexible opportunity to maintain income in 
times of few options [20], a rural livelihood that blends small commodity and subsistence 
production [25], and an activity that weaves together cultural, familial, and historic ties to a 
way of life not fully centered on commercial gain and full engagement in commercialized 
fisheries [26]. Small-scale fisheries worldwide are therefore important to creating and 
maintaining community sustainability through flexible arrangements that respond to local 
social and environmental conditions [23, 27].
This paper explores the current status of Iceland’s small-boat fisheries within the 
larger context of a national fisheries privatization system to provide a better understanding of 
the ways privatized fisheries management affects small-boat fishermen’s ability to engage in 
culturally and historically important livelihoods. Privatized access fishery systems can take 
on many forms and vary greatly in their specific regulations on transferability, species 
covered, initial allocation, boat sizes, etc. In Iceland, the variation in possible management 
structures combined with the ease of enacting policies for a comparatively small population
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of fishermen has led scholars, politicians, and others in the public sphere to remark on the 
“experimental” nature of fisheries privatization [28-32]. In fact, at the time of implementation, 
the ITQ system was often referred to as a temporary measure to protect fish stocks. Thirty 
years after fisheries privatization changes began, this so-called experiment has generated 
dramatic transformations that are still unfolding. Recent scholarship regarding Iceland’s 
fisheries privatization has focused on human rights and the legality of the ITQ system [33], 
the involvement of stakeholders and power imbalances in the management process [28], the 
changes in longline fishing practices [34], and fisherwomen’s experiences of change [35].
This paper explores the current status of the Icelandic ITQ system with particular focus on 
small-boat fisheries and fishing livelihoods. First, this paper documents the basic 
characteristics of individuals participating in the major small-boat fisheries. Second, it 
explores fishermen’s satisfaction with the current management arrangements and examines 
how individuals take part in governance processes. Third, it assesses the ability of Iceland’s 
small-scale fisheries to support entry-level fishermen. This research aims not to evaluate the 
effect of Iceland’s privatized management system on small-boat fisheries per se, but to 
understand the legacy of past fisheries management decisions, or “experiments,” for 
individuals who are currently participating in small-boat fisheries.
1.2 Icelandic fisheries
Iceland was one of the first countries to develop a nationwide privatized Individual 
Transferable Quota (ITQ) system, in which fishermen or companies can buy and sell fisheries 
quota, which is a percentage of a yearly total allowable catch (TAC) of one species [36]. 
Before the ITQ system, Icelandic fisheries were managed by various combinations of gear 
restrictions, area closures, licensing, effort restrictions and catch quotas, and were subsidized 
by the Icelandic government with mechanisms such as loans from public funds and debt 
restructuring [6, 12, 30]. First instituted with transferability restrictions in the early 1980s to 
demersal species, the ITQ system became fully transferable and was expanded to the majority 
of commercial fish species for boats over six Gross Registered Tonnes (GRT) with the 1990 
Icelandic Fisheries Management Act, while boats under six GRT were exempt [36]. In 
general, quota for each species was allotted to vessels based on their fishing record in the 
three years prior to ITQ implementation. For all species in the ITQ system, the Marine 
Research Institute (Hafrannsdknastofnun) gives official scientific advice and final TAC 
decisions are made by the Minister of Industry and Innovation (Figure 1.1). “Cod equivalents” 
are a common factor in quota trading, in which other species are given a weighted value in
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relation to their market value compared to cod. Administration of the ITQ system and 
licenses is undertaken by the Directorate of Fisheries (Fiskistofa), which also oversees 
compliance with other regulations such as area closures and gear restrictions. No discards are 
permitted in any fishery, and catch from small boats is landed at designated “fish markets” 
that give real time landing updates to the Directorate of Fisheries and then sell the catch 
through a centralized daily national auction [37].
After implementation of ITQs, changes in fisheries participation were immediate. 
Quota consolidated in larger companies and boats, and migrated away from rural 
communities. Many small-boat owners felt forced to sell out of the system due to increasing 
cost of quota, and public discontent with the equity of privatized fisheries continued to grow 
[12, 21, 38, 39]. In 2003, the community quota system (byggdakvdti) was enacted, in which 
each year, the Ministry gives quota directly to fishermen who will land the fish in particular 
communities under regulations specific to the community. (There were 7000 metric tons of 
cod equivalents assigned to the community quota system in the 2014-2015 fishing year, less 
than 2% of the 2015 TAC in cod equivalents). Then in 2004, handline and longline small 
boats under 15 Gross Tonnes (GT) were split away from the large-scale industrial ITQ 
fisheries in a small-boat ITQ system to counteract the accumulation of quota by large factory 
trawlers and companies. In 2009, the post-economic crash government instituted a new non- 
ITQ small-boat hand line season called “coastal fishing” (strandveidar) in an effort to offer 
access for newcomers to fishing lifestyles, partly in response to rulings by the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee on the social equity problems of the privatization of fisheries 
resources [40], and partly to revitalize small coastal communities that had suffered from loss 
of ITQs. Coastal fishing is also managed under the Ministry and Directorate of Fisheries, and 
includes four regions that each have a portion of the same TAC used in the ITQ fisheries 
(totaling 8,600 metric tons in 2015, less than 2% of the 2015 TAC in cod equivalents). 
Coastal fishing with a maximum of four jig machines is allowed for 14 hours per day from 
Monday to Thursday during May, June, July and August and is subject to a daily catch limit 
of 650 kg of cod equivalents of demersal species, mainly cod, saithe, and rockfish. The other 
non-ITQ fishery, the small-boat spring lumpfish roe gillnet fishery, has always existed 
outside of the ITQ system and is managed by limited entry licensing as well as days-at-sea 
(32 continuous days as of the 2015 season), and net length and mesh size restrictions put into 
law by the Ministry and Directorate of Fisheries (Figure 1.1).
As shown in Figure 1.1, there are five major fishery sectors in Iceland, and four of 
these categories relate to small-boat fisheries: small-boat ITQ, coastal fisheries, community
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quota, and lumpfish. These categories are not exclusive and there is often overlap in 
participation between small-boat fisheries, and between large and small-boat fisheries. 
Currently, small-boat fisheries are defined as long line, hand line, and gillnet boats under 15 
meters in length and 30 GT. Shrimp boats, larger long liners, Danish seines, purse seines, and 
pelagic and bottom trawlers over 30 GT are included in the large-boat ITQ fishery. In 2014, 
small-boat fisheries consisted of around 1,418 boats (compared to 267 large boats) and 
employed around 1600 individuals full time. In the 2014-2015 fishing year, the total catch for 
small-boat fisheries was about 8% of the total catch landed in Iceland (or 91,740 metric tons, 
compared to 987,556 metric tons for large-boat fisheries), and 14% of the small boat catch 
(or 1% of the total catch) was landed by non-ITQ fisheries [41].
1.3 Methods
This research explores the experiences and attitudes of Icelandic small-boat fishermen 
engaged in different fisheries management arrangements under the Icelandic Ministry of 
Industry and Innovation. Data were collected with a national questionnaire mailed in August 
2013 (at the end of the 2012-2013 fishing year, which runs from September-August). It 
assessed a conceptual framework of themes gathered through earlier phases of ethnographic 
research in Northwest Iceland (August 2011-August 2013) that included participant 
observation on fishing boats and fish processing plants, and semi-structured interviews with 
fishermen, their families, and community leaders. Mailed surveys were chosen as a 
compliment to the previous qualitative research because surveys collect data from a larger 
number of individuals that can be extrapolated to a sample population, minimize response 
effects based on the interviewer [42, 43] and can be used to test ethnographic understandings. 
Salant and Dillman’s multi-step process was used to establish four direct contacts with the 
respondents [43]. After back translating [42] and pre-testing the survey with key informants, 
first a letter was sent announcing the survey, and then a survey packet was mailed seven days 
later. Seven days after that a reminder postcard was sent, and finally a second survey packet 
to those who did not respond four weeks after the first mailing.
The Directorate of Fisheries 2012 license database was used to produce a stratified 
random list of 500 small-boat fishermen (44% of the total database) from the listed 1,145 
unique addresses of registered small fishing boats (long line, hand line, and gillnet boats 
under 15 GT). Small boats are technically defined as those vessels under 30 GT, but at the 
time of sampling the majority of boats fell under 15 GT which was therefore reflected in the 
sampling stratification. Addresses affiliated with large boats (shrimp boats, large long liners,
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Danish seines, purse seines, and pelagic and bottom trawlers over 15 GT) were excluded 
from the sample list. The list of 500 boat owners was stratified to equally sample fishermen 
in the three main management schemes for small boats in Iceland: small-boat ITQ fisheries 
(including a “hook and line” ITQ system), lumpfish, coastal fishing, and any combination 
thereof (Table 1.1). Community quota holders were not sampled as a specific group because 
there is significant overlap between community quota holders and small-boat ITQ fisheries, 
and because community quota can also be given to large-boat ITQ holders. Crew members 
are not included in the database and therefore the survey sampled only boat owners and 
license holders. The survey was made up of four sections related to dominant themes in 
small-boat fisheries identified in earlier research phases: demographics and fishing 
participation, employment and community, fisheries management, and conservation and 
environment. Questions consisted of Likert scales, multiple choice, and open-ended 
responses. Differences between quota holders and non-quota holders, fishery type, and other 
demographic variables were analyzed using Kruskal-Wallis tests to compare differences in 
continuous data (summed Likert items and income) and Pearson’s chi-squared tests to 
compare differences in categorical data (multiple choice questions). Open-ended responses 
were coded and analyzed for thematic similarities; exemplar quotes from those responses are 
presented to give deeper context to the discussion of survey results.
1.4 Results and discussion
1.4.1. Survey response and fisheries participation
Of the 500 surveys mailed, 21 were returned as undeliverable, and 164 were completed and 
returned for an adjusted response rate of 34.2% (representing 14% of the total population of 
small boat owners in Iceland). This response rate is on the higher end of the average response 
from mailed surveys to targeted occupational groups in Iceland (25-35%) (University of 
Iceland Social Science Research Institute, pers. com.) and is similar to the range of 13-35% 
from other recent studies of resource users using a comparable method [44-48]. Surveys 
were returned from respondents from primary fishery groups within small-boat fisheries 
(both self-identified primary small-boat fishery and their participation in the 2013 fishing 
year) in similar stratified percentages as were sampled (Table 1.1); however, 11% of 
respondents identified as being primarily part of the large-boat ITQ system.
Those who primarily took part in the large-boat ITQ system were therefore 
accidentally sampled because they also held permits for a small-boat fishery, most often 
coastal fishing. This reflects a challenge in labeling and surveying Icelandic fishermen for
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research purposes and also illustrates an important aspect of Icelandic fisheries and a 
characteristic of many fisheries worldwide: individuals are engaged in multiple fisheries over 
the year, as well as through the course of their lifetimes. While 11% of respondents identified 
their primary fishery to be large-boat ITQ fisheries, a larger number (28%), actually 
participated in large boat fisheries in the 2012-2013 fishing year (Table 1.1), suggesting that 
participation in a large-boat fishery does not always lead to identification with that fishery. 
Furthermore, 60% reported participating in large-boat fisheries at some point in their fishing 
career, most commonly as a skipper or crew member.
1.4.2 Satisfaction with fisheries management
Although survey respondents were engaged in relatively powerful positions in small-boat 
fisheries —!as quota holders, captains, and owner-operators — dissatisfaction with the ITQ 
system and its related politics was common in survey results. To assess satisfaction with 
fisheries management, a seven-item Likert scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.828) was developed 
including statements focusing on: fishermen’s involvement in management, protection and 
utilization of fishery stocks, economic efficiency, and the ability of the current system to 
ensure stable employment in fisheries. Respondents answered using a 5-point scale, “ 1” for 
aspects they were strongly dissatisfied with and “5” for aspects they were strongly satisfied 
with. The summed score for each respondent was calculated to reflect overall satisfaction 
with management (total range 7-35; 7 = highly dissatisfied, 21 = neutral, 35 = highly 
satisfied).
Overall satisfaction was low to neutral and there were no significant differences 
between fisheries (Table 1.2). Because of the complexity of fisheries participation mentioned 
above, a fisherman could consider an ITQ fishery his primary fishery even though he mostly 
rents the quota to land the fish and vice versa: a coastal fisherman could consider coastal 
fisheries his primary fishery, even though he makes money from leasing quota. Therefore, 
rather than participation in or identification by a certain fishery, possession of quota itself 
best predicts satisfaction with fisheries management: those who held quota were more 
satisfied with current fisheries management (Kruskal Wallis %2 = 12.511 p  < 0.001). However, 
it should be noted that both quota holders and non-quota holders remained at the lower end of 
the overall satisfaction scale (quota = 18.77, non = 15.39). The two primary sources of 
dissatisfaction and proposed alternatives are discussed below.
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1.4.2.1 Source o f  dissatisfaction 1: The purpose o f  the ITQ system
A major source of dissatisfaction with fisheries management came from tensions regarding 
the “purpose” of the ITQ system: what its major end goals should have been, compared to 
how the system is currently operating in practice. The majority of survey respondents (76%) 
were involved in commercial fishing during the time privatization policies were being 
implemented (1984-1990) and had observed the ITQ system unfolding. Respondents 
expressed a shared understanding that the ITQ system was originally meant for 
environmental end goals, but that the focus on economic end-goals tended to overshadow 
environmental goals, as the following response to an open-ended question highlights: “The 
quota system has become an economical system, conducted in Excel. It is no longer a system 
fo r  ecosystem protection and resource utilization.”
Although the history behind support for ITQ systems does in fact stem from economic 
theory, some countries, including Iceland, implemented ITQs in a time of concern over stock 
depletion. The need for ITQs is often discussed both in terms of stock protection and 
economic efficiency, and these discourses have become difficult to separate [11, 49]. 
Increasingly, environmental and conservation rationales are used to justify ITQ 
implementation, although the linkage between ITQs and positive environmental outcomes is 
not well supported and many examples show a negative relationship (as reviewed in [11]). In 
Iceland, legal documents stated that ITQs were meant to be a temporary measure to protect 
fish stocks in light of declines in the Canadian and Norwegian cod fisheries [40]. However, in 
practice, the focus of the Icelandic ITQ system has always been on economic efficiency. The 
neoliberal economic logic is that fisheries contribute immensely to the state of the Icelandic 
economy as a major export good and therefore increase the overall standard of living to the 
benefit of the nation as a whole [50].
1.4.2.1.1 Focus on economic end goals leads to unfair leasing arrangements
One of the mechanisms related to the economic focus of the ITQ system and fishermen’s 
subsequent dissatisfaction is the quota market itself. The ITQ system in its present form was 
viewed by many respondents to be a source of corruption that continues to unfold, as the 
following survey responses illustrate:
Managing a fishery is necessary, but they should abolish quota, that's where you fin d
the most corruption.
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This is all that has changed: the quota system is unfair and makes things harder fo r  
those who are not doing the money-laundering.
In small-boat fisheries, accusations of corruption, money-laundering and unfair 
business practices are most often related to the practice of quota renting and leasing. Leasing 
arrangements create inequity in fishing communities [51] and our previous ethnographic 
research suggested that details about quota ownership, renting, and leasing would be difficult 
and sensitive data to collect and therefore the following data do not reflect the complex 
relationships between quota renters and holders and between communities. Those who rent 
fear being viewed as somehow less of a fisherman, or as someone not able to take care of 
their own fishing business. Those who hold quota and lease it out fear being seen as greedy, 
or as making unethical business transactions by leasing or selling quota away from their 
home community. The following comments from different respondents help to illustrate 
experiences of quota rental:
Only a small number o f  individuals have control over all the quota in the country and  
they seem to not be able to share even a single kilo with others. They seem to see every 
increase in quota as their own property and at the same time they say that they cannot 
pay a normal fee  fo r  the resources, but still they themselves have dividends that are 
even higher than the resource fee. Still they are able to rent out the quota to fisheries at 
a price that is ha lf or even 2/3 higher than the market price [o f  the quota itself]. This 
needs to be changed. This is unfair to the nation.
Not everyone sits at the same table in all fisheries systems. The renters have to pay all 
the same fees (licenses, harbor fees, etc.) as those who have had quota allocated to 
them fo r  free over the years. On top o f  that they have to pay the rent fo r  the quota, 
which is out o f  this world -  so there is little left to live o ff of.
How can it be that the possessor o f  quota, however he might have got it, can rent it out 
- as an example, cod fo r  200 ISK/kg - but the one catching the fish, with all included 
costs (boat, crew, equipment, labor) gets perhaps 260ISK fo r  the kilo. The best fishing  
business is probably the one that can rent out as much as they can without all the extra 
costs.
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You cannot become anything else than a slave. Personal security is not good. The 
owners o f  the quota can take it away whenever they want and leave the skipper and 
crew unemployed.
Our results suggest that just over half of respondents (53%) did not hold quota, and 
25% of non-quota-holders rented quota. On the other hand, 49% of those who hold quota also 
rent quota, and 47% of quota holders reported leasing anywhere from 2-100% of their quota 
out (although 15% left this question unanswered). Therefore those who hold quota are more 
likely to rent additional quota (Pearson X  = 12.867, p  < 0.001). The renting market therefore 
consists mainly of those already invested in the quota system, rather than those who do not 
hold quota but participate in ITQ fisheries by renting from quota holders. Others have 
suggested that “contract fishing” has declined over time [50]. The findings of this study 
suggest that it may be more appropriate to think of the quota rental market as having changed 
from “contract fishing” by those who do not hold quota to “semi-contract fishing” by those 
that do hold at least some quota. These individuals do not hold “enough” quota for one reason 
or another, and are therefore subject to the same leasing practices that create inequity as those 
who do not hold quota.
1.4.2.1.2 Focus on economic end goals leads to discards and the “tragic commons ”
A second mechanism related to small-boat fishermen’s dissatisfaction with the purpose of the 
ITQ system with focus on economic end goals can be seen in the environmental concerns 
about ITQ management. There is a general consensus in the scientific community that cod, 
the single most important species in Iceland, was overfished in the 1970s and 1980s. Over 
500,000 metric tons of cod were landed in 1955, and close to 450,000 metric tons in 1981 
[52]. After the implementation of the ITQ system for cod in 1984, cod landings regularly 
exceed the TAC, and often that TAC exceeded the TAC recommended by the Marine 
Research Institute. In the late 1990s, there was continued concern over the collapse of 
Atlantic cod stocks [53] and the Harvest Control Rule (HCR) for cod was enacted in 1996, 
which now states that the TAC for cod must be a direct calculation of 20% of the biomass of 
year 4 and older cod estimated by the Marine Research Institute. TACs and landings 
continued to decline more or less until 2009, but since then have been steadily increasing and 
the 2015-2016 fishing year TAC is set at 239,000 metric tons [52]. Currently, there is a 
general upward trend of spawning stock biomass and recruitment, suggesting that, at least by
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these measures, the cod stock is performing well, and projections show cod spawning and 
reference stock biomass increasing to pre-1980 levels by 2019 [52].
Many fishermen, however, view the decrease in overall cod catches compared to the 
1980s as a cause for concern. Fluctuations in the cod stock can be caused by a variety of 
factors, such as environmental regimes shifts that influence prey availability or water 
temperature, as well as overfishing or other human activities. The primary environmental 
concern of small-boat fishermen was not overfishing as such, but the discarding of catch and 
the potential related negative impacts on fish stocks, as explained through the following 
comments from different respondents:
The system is profitable and efficient from  the business operations perspective, the 
biggest problem o f  this system is the bad treatment o f  the natural resources.
The “tragic commons ” is still a problem. In the way fishermen treat the natural 
resource, like discarding fish. I  have witnessed these things and many others have told 
me similar stories. One example I  know o f  happened aboard a trawler owned by one o f  
the big fisheries that got a lot o f  small haddock in their nets. They took all the big ones, 
then the smaller ones were dumped back into the ocean. Instead o f  moving to another 
location, they threw the nets in the same place and did the same thing when the nets 
came back up. An identical case also happened on another trawler with medium-sized 
cod. This is the result o f  the regulations that states that ships can bring in 5% more 
than their quota (and no less than 50% o f  their quota); the fishermen started picking  
out the biggest fish  and throwing out the small ones. There are many more stories just 
like these and it makes it difficult to see how these regulations are supposed to protect 
and sustain the fish-stock.
A lot o f  fish is dumped. Cod has been dumped, and haddock, all depending on what 
types they have quota for. Then they come to shore with specific amounts offish that 
give the most money and the other fish  is dumped.
The “dumping”, or high-grading, of lower value fish and the discard of species 
fishermen do not have quota for can be a sensitive subject to study because legally all catch 
must be landed and therefore it can be difficult to obtain accurate discarding data. Prior 
estimates of high-grading in Iceland are low for large-boat fisheries [54] as well as small-boat
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fisheries [55]. However, earlier phases of our research suggested that the presence of high- 
grading and discarding of no-quota catch was something about which small-boat fishermen 
were concerned. To obtain some estimate of the presence of discarding in small-boat fisheries, 
survey respondents were asked to report simply the presence or absence of discarding in the 
fisheries in which they participated in during 2013. Those who participated in coastal fishing 
reported the lowest incidence of discarding (30% of coastal fishers reported some form of 
discarding), followed by small-boat ITQ (39%), lumpfish (49%), and large-boat ITQ (59%). 
The frequency or amount of discarding would be difficult to estimate using a mailed survey 
technique, and therefore these self-reported discard data may not fully clarify discarding 
practices or their ecological significance. However, the mere acknowledgement of discarding 
activity by the small-boat fishermen themselves in both the ITQ and non-ITQ fisheries alike 
provides a counter-example to literature focusing on ITQs as a conservation tool [56-57] and 
supports previous analyses suggesting that private ownership itself does not always ensure 
care for the resource and solve issues of the tragedy of the commons, and in fact may 
encourage destructive practices like discarding [58-64].
Those engaged in ITQ fisheries become the rational actors that the economic logic of 
the system is based upon, making the best choice of the options available to them to ensure 
the economic viability of their fishing business, sometimes engaging in environmentally 
negative behaviors. In the same way, those in non-ITQ fisheries are similarly bound to the 
ITQ system due to Iceland’s landing and no-discard rules: as bycatch comes up for which 
they do not have quota, they are forced to either illegally discard the catch, rent quota for the 
day to land that particular species, or pay the penalty of landing catch without quota. Again, 
whether they like it or not, sometimes the best economic option for a non-ITQ fisherman is to 
discard his catch. The dissatisfaction of small-boat fishermen concerning end goals of 
fisheries management is therefore due to the fact that they felt forced to engage in discarding 
as a result of the current ITQ scheme, although they recognized the potential negative 
environmental impacts, as one respondent explained:
The government has certainly tried to limit the amount o f  fish thrown away but at the 
same time they have tried to undermine the issue and some even tried to suppress it.
The spokesmen fo r  the quota system have tried to deny all suggestions for  
improvements, since they experience it as an attack on the system in a whole, but not a 
smaller issue that can be fixed. The clearest case o f  that happened a decade ago. Some 
fishermen video-taped others dumping small fish  back into the ocean and brought it to
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the media. They had no choice since fishing was their livelihood and they, ju s t like 
others, had to fe ed  their families. The orders fo r  the dumping came from  the captain 
that had received his orders on land, it was based on the situation o f  quota on the ship. 
When the fishermen had enough o f  this they film ed that video. After the news story 
broke, other similar cases seemed to pop up from  everywhere and others wanted to 
come forward and tell their stories. This came to an end quickly when the head o f  the 
Directorate o f  Fisheries stepped up and was interviewed on the television, he stated 
that fishermen caught dumping fish  in the ocean would be prosecuted. In other words, 
he said that the pawns that were made to dump the fish  would be held responsible, but 
not the ones giving the orders. By doing this they prevented more stories surfacing and  
a general discussion on the matter. It would be fun  to compare this to the Icelandic 
bank collapse in 2008. What would people say i f  a judge stated that he was going to 
make the cashiers and the employees o f  the banks responsible fo r  the criminal activity 
in the banks? Or even attack all those who would come forward and reveal the criminal 
activity they had witnessed amongst the executives?
1.4.2.2 Source o f  dissatisfaction 2: Decision-making power
The second major source of dissatisfaction with fisheries management was related to the 
governance of Icelandic fisheries itself. Governance can be defined as the social and political 
institutions that are involved in fisheries, while management can be considered as the specific 
arrangement for fisheries decided upon by the governance process [27]. In many respondents’ 
minds, the ITQ system itself had been linked with the governance institutions so that it was 
impossible to think of one without the other. As one respondent wrote: “[In the past] I  could 
be in charge o f  my own fishing, instead o f  leaving it to the theories o f  not-so-bright 
politicians.” Put another way, small-boat fishermen perceived the ITQ system itself as no 
different from the human political institutions and processes that govern the rules 
surrounding the ITQ system. This is due to the specific relationship among the players 
involved in the Icelandic fisheries decision-making process.
The theoretical design of the ITQ system accounts for the buying and selling of quota 
to be carried out under market dynamics, leaving the Marine Research Institute with the task 
of recommending a yearly TAC upon which the quota percentages are based. This creates a 
simplified management system, where fishermen (or social science data focused on 
fishermen and fishing communities) have no official input. As Christensen et al. note: “In 
Iceland, fishermen formally play a small role in the management system, but in practice they
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have easy and direct access to the Minister, who has the final say in most matters” [50]. In 
practice, however, this direct and easy access is not equal across all types of fishermen, and 
the TAC decisions by the Ministry and specifics of regulations set by the Directorate of 
Fisheries can depend heavily upon lobbying by specific trade unions (see [28] for a detailed 
analysis of stakeholder engagement). For small-boat fishermen, there is one main union 
(National Association of Small Boat Owners: Landssambandsmabataeigenda), and most 
local chapters gather once a year to discuss issues. Each local chapter sends a report to the 
chairman, who then speaks for all small-boat owners at the national level. The infrequent and 
relatively disengaged involvement cannot respond to current issues in a timely matter, as this 
survey comment illustrates:
A man came by the other day to close a big area fo r  coastal fishing  — because o f  one 
boat that had too much fish  — then they went to the next fjo rd  and were going to close 
o ff an even bigger area. Then they closed o ff the whole area, it wouldn't have been 
necessary, this is arrogance and abuse o f  power.
The exclusion of fishermen themselves from formal and flexible decision-making 
processes has led to dissatisfaction and distrust in governance institutions as small-boat 
fishermen, particularly those in rural communities, do not often have easy and direct access 
to the Minister. A sense of helplessness permeated the surveys with comments such as: “They 
are always changing the rules,” and “We do n ’t make the ru les '’ Fishermen in all small-boat 
systems generally perceived little or no agency or power in the decision-making process:
The Marine Research Institute and the Directorate o f  Fisheries are controlled by men 
that think they know everything but don't know much and don't listen to anything, that's 
my experience.
Increased interference by others has often made the fisherm en’s life harder through the 
years and their views have not been given credit.
The Marine Research Institute is dangerous fo r  the industry. The ones who sit at the 
desks don't know anything about us and want to control everything, we are not listened 
to. They close areas without knowing what they are doing.
18
The Marine Research Institute is in an ivory tower with their advice that not always, 
but many times, are way out o f  tune with what is happening out on the fishing grounds. 
But they seem to have gotten themselves in such a position with the government that 
their conclusions are not questioned.
The majority of respondents (87%) agreed with the Likert statement “The government 
needs to consult with fishermen when it comes to fisheries management” (Figure 1.2), but did 
not agree that need was actually taken into account in making policy. There is no guarantee 
that local comments or concerns are brought up officially, and even if they were, the Ministry 
and the Directorate of Fisheries are under no formal obligation to take union lobbies or 
fishermen’s knowledge into account whether the topic be area closures, season openings, 
gear restrictions, or stock health and status. The mismatch between fishermen’s knowledge 
and the scientific research was highlighted by many respondents as a specific reason for 
dissatisfaction with the governance process:
You can calculate the business environment. But the size o f  a fish-stock? How can 
people predict the size o f  the stock in the ocean when they cannot count all the reindeer 
in the country that you can see with your own eyes and are only located on the east 
coast.
Fishermen need to be listened to, trawl surveys cannot be the only criteria used, 
because the trawlers are always using the same areas and the same equipment.
The lack of inclusion of fishermen’s knowledge and the unequal power in the 
decision-making process highlight a paradox in neoliberal fisheries theories. Some scholars 
have explored the theoretical groundings of fisheries rights privatization that allow for the 
reduction of the role of the state by the transferring of fishing right allocation power to the 
market [16, 65]. These scholars highlight the paradox that while the market is seen as the fair 
arbiter of fishing rights, often privatization systems require oversight by political institutions 
that can in fact further existing inequalities or create new unequal power arrangements. 
Scholars question whether equality and limitations on commodification can exist in general 
neoliberal fisheries management and governance [66-68], but in Iceland it has in fact 
increased political divide, creating both unequal political governance arrangements as well as 
differential impacts on small-boat fisheries.
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1.4.2.3 Alternative management arrangements
In a multiple choice question, 38% of respondents stated that an ITQ system was the best 
future arrangement for small-boat fisheries in Iceland; among them, 26% thought quota 
should not be transferable, but the rest were generally satisfied with the basic idea of an ITQ 
system. The other 62% believed that small boats should operate under a completely different 
system, and listed those ideas in an open-ended question. Those responses were then coded 
and categorized into four major options. The most popular option was some kind of regional 
system, followed by temporal limits, catch limits, and a national quota that is rented from the 
government every year with built-in breaks to newcomers or by local area (Figure 1.3).
The devolution of power to a regional system was explained by many respondents to 
not only offer a solution to developing a more equitable management system, but a more 
democratic governance system as well, where local councils would have control of 
community and regionally-based quota in addition to the decision-making process itself. The 
popularity of a regional control system is a slight contrast to the findings of Kokorsch et al. 
[28], who sampled stakeholders from Icelandic large and small-boat fisheries as well as 
processing workers and others such as office-workers in fisheries support services. Among all 
stakeholders, the study found a non-transferable quota system was most preferred rather than 
a regional system [28]. This difference in findings highlights the importance of understanding 
the views of various stakeholders, and specifically those more under-represented groups such 
as small-boat fishermen. In fact, our study found that 58% of small-boat survey respondents 
felt ITQs were the best option for large boats, which further exemplifies the importance for 
variable management schemes for different kinds of fisheries. Furthermore, there was a 
common belief among survey respondents that large and small fishing operations could co­
exist given the right management scenario, as one fishermen wrote:
Nature has done it fo r  us, good fisheries can have both -  one end you have large 
trawlers going after open water species and then small boats are close to shore. Those 
close to the coast will always be limited by gear, small boat size, weather — so you  
do n ’t need to worry much about them.
This acknowledgement of the different sizes and types of fisheries with corresponding 
management systems is similar to warnings by critics and proponents alike that ITQs are not 
a one-size-fits-all solution [21, 68, 69]. In Iceland, however, although there are some policies
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aimed specifically at small boats and rural communities, the governance process and 
management arrangement are based upon free transferability of access rights for both large 
and small boats. Seminal research in the early stages of the ITQ system found that fishermen 
strongly resisted fisheries privatization on moral grounds, considering it evil or immoral 
because individual labor was devalued with the increasing focus on capital accumulation 
through private ownership [70]. The concept of ownership continues to be a complex theme 
to explore in Icelandic fisheries. In response to the Likert statement “Ownership is the best 
way to protect fishery resources,” 49% disagreed, but 25% were neutral and 26% agreed, and 
there were no statistical differences between fishery type or quota ownership (Figure 1.2). 
The lack of clarity in these responses is most likely due to the fact that recent public 
discourse in Iceland regarding fisheries management and the de facto  ownership of marine 
resources has acknowledged the shortcomings of private and corporate ownership, calling for 
an exploration of the options in state or community collective ownership. The question for 
many small-boat fishermen therefore seems to be not whether fish stocks or the right to fish 
can be owned, but who can own them. The ideas of regional management and community 
quotas are based upon ownership, but have less focus on accumulation and capital gain as the 
current private ownership system. This important difference led Christensen et al. [50] to 
conclude: “ ... the opportunity to manage fisheries by for example adaptive, regional, species- 
specific criteria as a complement to the ITQs exists. Such measures might detract from the 
economic efficiency of the current system, but could address some of the emerging and 
pressing biological and social issues facing the system.”
1.4.3 Access to fisheries resources
Survey respondents valued the fact that they could participate in fisheries as a tie into 
Icelandic national culture. In fact, 94% agreed that fisheries are a part of the Icelandic 
national identity (Figure 1.2). The act of fishing was often referred to as something that 
should remain an option for all Icelanders to try. One respondent summed it up like this:
It is good fo r  anybody to try their hand at something within the fishing industry.
Fishing is in our blood. From person to person — and this will make a living fo r  the
nation fo r  a long time.
As in many other cultures around the world, fishing is an inherited livelihood. 
Individuals reported a mean of 3.2 generations of family engaged in fishing; however, many
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responses to the question “how many generations of your family have been involved in 
commercial fisheries?” suggested much deeper connections to fishing livelihoods, e.g., 
answers included: “since the 1800s,” “from  the beginning o f  Icelandic history,” “since the 
oldest men remember”, “all mine before and after,” and sometimes simply “all.” There were 
no significant differences between fishery group or quota-holding and generations fishing, 
suggesting at least one cohesive thread in Icelandic small-boat fishermen: fishing is an 
activity deeply-rooted in family and personal history. As one respondent wrote: “Iw a s raised 
in a fam ily offishermen and therefore fishing is like a drug. You never get rid o f  the interest 
in fish ing .” Although fishing is part of a national identity and access to fish resources is a 
constitutional right of all Icelanders [40], the start-up costs can be overwhelming for 
newcomers who wish to try fishing. The following sections explore the specifics of these 
barriers to entry often linked with ITQ systems, and assess the current options for newcomers 
in non-ITQ fisheries.
1.4.3.1 Barriers to entry
One common aspect of ITQ systems is the decreased access for newcomers to enter 
fisheries. Other research shows the negative impact of fisheries privatization schemes on 
those attempting to enter fisheries [9, 15, 71-73] as original quota holders stay in the system 
and access for newcomers is limited. This “greying of the fleet” is present in Icelandic small- 
boat fisheries as well. As one respondent wrote, “There are very few  young men and women 
who can afford to pay that much to w ork.” Respondents explained that as the quota became 
tied up in exchange between larger companies paying higher prices, the cost of purchasing 
quota became prohibitive to new small-boat fishermen.
Youth and newcomers to fisheries represent a striking gap in the survey responses and 
the authors have no reason to expect a response bias as many small-boat fishing companies 
are single-person entities. Ten out of the 164 respondents had been fishing for less than 5 
years, and three were under the age of 30. Survey respondents were on average 58 years old 
(range 21-80, SD = 13) and had over 30 years of fishing experience (range 2-61, SD = 16). 
And although 44% of survey respondents had worked as crew at some point in their career, 
averaging 13 years crew experience, the majority was now skippers or captains, representing 
perhaps the last generation of small-boat fishermen to work their way up through fisheries as 
was once common, from crew to skipper to owner. At the same time, survey respondents also 
reflect something of an anomaly; they are the generation that was gifted the original quota and 
have fought to keep that quota and build their fishing businesses.
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As the quota holders’ fishing businesses grew, so did their percentage of income from 
fisheries. Respondents who held quota earned significantly more of their income from 
fisheries compared to those who did not hold quota (Kruskal-Wallis x2 = 17.296, p  < 0.001), 
suggesting a key difference between quota-holding and non-quota-holding small-boat 
fishermen. In popular discourse, the former are considered full-time fishermen, the latter as 
part-time or leisure fishermen (although they sell the catch for profit). About a fourth of 
survey respondents (27%) fished exclusively outside of the ITQ system in the 2012-2013 
fishing year (meaning lumpfish, coastal fishing, or combining the two, and did not rent or 
hold quota) and they made less than half of their yearly income from fisheries. However, the 
common framings of full time or part-time fishermen are limited and our data reflect on a 
slightly more nuanced understanding of fishing as an occupation. There was strong agreement 
(75%) among all respondents to the Likert statement “it is not possible to make enough 
money in fishing for the year outside the ITQ system” (Figure 1.2). More tellingly, those who 
did not hold quota were more likely to respond “no” to the question “Would you advise a 
young person to enter your primary fishery?” (Pearson x2 = 5.076, p  = 0.024).
The question is therefore whether fishermen have the upward mobility to move from 
part-time or newcomer to a full time quota-holding fisherman. This flexibility is an important 
and traditionally common trait in small-scale fisheries [23, 27]. In response to the statement:
“I have the flexibility to join other fisheries if  my primary fishery is not doing well in any 
given season,” those engaged in non-ITQ fisheries disagreed most strongly (Figure 1.4).
Those that were engaged in all three small-boat fisheries perceived themselves to be most 
flexible, suggesting that individuals who participate in ITQ fisheries have the flexibility to 
engage in additional non-ITQ fisheries, not the other way around. The non-ITQ fisheries and 
their limited ability to support upward mobility of newcomers into small-boat fisheries are 
reviewed below.
1.4.3.2 Non-ITQ option fo r  newcomers: Coastal fisheries
Coastal fishing is a relatively new system and participation varies year to year as the system 
settles. The majority (73%) of survey respondents had tried coastal fishing at some point 
while just over half (56%) fished it in 2012-2013, 19% exclusively (Table 1.1). While the 
coastal fishing system was designed to allow open entry into small-boat fisheries, our survey 
suggests it is not enough to meaningfully impact true newcomers in fisheries. For example, 
the average age of the 31 survey respondents who fished coastal fisheries exclusively in 2013 
was 60 years old, and they had 30 years of fishing experience, which is no different from the
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average of all small-boat fishermen combined. Coastal fisheries participants made on average 
less than one fourth of their income from fisheries and 67% would not advise a young person 
to enter that fishery. Respondents felt it was simply too hard to make money in coastal 
fisheries and made comments such as, “This is only fo r  people who really enjoy this and are 
passionate about it because it is not very profitable,” and “I  have a son that bought a boat a 
year ago [to fish  coastal fishing]. He's fishing as much as he can but it ju s t doesn't work fo r  
him without my help.” The high cost of participating in coastal fisheries comes from the costs 
of boats, jig machines and bait, captain licenses and safety regulations, plus fuel and time 
spent away from home — a fourth of coastal fishing participants lived in larger areas and 
fished in smaller communities. Finally, as was noted above, large-boat fishermen were 
accidently included in the survey because they held coastal fishing permits. These details 
regarding cost and flexibility suggest that coastal fisheries most benefit individuals who are 
already engaged in fishing or who are financially established in other trades or professions, 
not newcomers in rural communities.
1.4.3.3 Non-ITQ option fo r  newcomers: Lumpfish
The lumpfish fishery can be equally restricting. In the 2012-2013 fishing year, 10% of 
survey respondents fished only lumpfish, and their median income from fisheries was 
between 20-30% of total yearly income. Although lumpfish is not part of the ITQ system, it 
is managed by limited licenses (under 500) that can be expensive and not often available for 
sale, and additional costs come from captain licensing and safety regulations. Because it is a 
seasonal roe fishery, lumpfish fishing has historically been combined with other fisheries, 
and participation can vary greatly year to year based on roe price forecasts. Respondents did 
not consider it a true entry-level fishery that allows participants to save up for investment in 
more year-round fisheries. Lumpfish fishermen were split on advising a young person to 
enter fisheries; those who answered “no” cited short seasons, increasing costs and rules, and 
low or fluctuating price for roe. The half who would advise a young person to enter the 
lumpfish fishery commented that it was meaningful work, fun, and new entrants were 
important to maintain fishing knowledge. Our earlier phases of ethnographic data also 
suggest that lumpfish fishing is host to unique historical and cultural aspects such as passing 
along knowledge, and in that way has always been considered a very different fishery from 
other commercial fisheries, where participation is not focused on the intent to become a full­
time fisherman.
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1.5 Conclusion
A number of concerns facing small-boat fishermen are the result of Iceland’s ongoing 
neoliberal experimentation in fisheries. An experiment implies a temporary situation that 
could be discarded if the experiment results were unfavorable. What supposedly began as an 
experiment, however, has taken hold in an important way and the ITQ system is entrenched 
and difficult to change. The specific mechanisms that lead to negative impacts and 
experiences for small-boat fishermen and rural communities were not one time shocks to a 
system that otherwise has since reorganized, but continue to affect small-boat fisheries 30 
years after initial privatization in Iceland.
This research has shown that: 1) Icelandic small-boat fishermen have important 
cultural, historical and non-economic connections to fishing, 2) quota holders and non-quota 
holders alike express dissatisfaction with fisheries management because the focus on 
economic end goals tends to overshadow other biological or social management goals, and 3) 
cost and access barriers exist in the non-ITQ fisheries as well as ITQ fisheries.
While this research has detailed the complexity of small-boat fishermen and fisheries, 
the major thread related to small-boat fishing today is the design of the governance system. 
Icelandic small-boat fishermen are engaged in multiple fisheries and have a wide range of 
experience and knowledge, but at the same time are completely separated from the decision­
making process, which is essentially the same for ITQ and non-ITQ fisheries alike. Although 
small-boat fishermen are not without political preferences, their voices are under-represented 
in current governance arrangement. This research has shown that when natural resource users 
are disengaged from governance processes, and when local concerns are not addressed, the 
legitimacy of the governance system is devalued -  therefore threatening not only the long 
term sustainability of the resource but violating principles of equity and human rights as well. 
This chronic underrepresentation can be offset by alternative forms of management and the 
creation of opportunities for knowledge transfer to the next generation and a space for their 
inclusion in current fisheries.
Bottom-up fisheries management, especially in small-boat and small-scale fisheries 
with local and regional characteristics can empower local fishermen to make environmentally, 
economically and socially wise decisions in their fishing operations, as well as benefit rural 
fishing communities that are so culturally, historically and economically dependent on 
fisheries. An updated, flexible fisheries governance system that would allow for newcomers 
and larger participation in year-round fisheries would offer more secure access and 
employment to culturally important livelihoods, as well as deter negative environmental
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behavior based on economic incentive related to a national ITQ system. Co-management or 
other forms of participatory management would create a platform for discussion or 
incorporate fishermen’s knowledge in decision making processes, particularly from small- 
boat fishermen who — as this research has shown — access fisheries resources in different 
ways, times, and who have vested cultural and historic ties to fisheries. Paving a path towards 
truly sustainable fisheries means taking the unique and dynamic social and cultural aspects of 
small-scale fisheries into account.
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1.7 Figures
Figure 1.1: Schematic overview of Icelandic fisheries governance.
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Figure 1.2: Percent agreement in response to selected Likert statements. Figure by J.M. 
Coleman using function ‘likert’ in package ‘HH’ [74] in the statistical program R [75],
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Figure 1.3: Survey responses to the multiple choice question: “What is the best management 
scheme for Icelandic small-boat fisheries?” All percentages reported are the proportion of 
total responses.
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Figure 1.4: Percent agreement by fishery group to the Likert statement: “I have the flexibility 
to join other fisheries if  my primary fishery is not doing well in any given season.” Figure by 
J.M. Coleman using function ‘likert’ in package ‘HH’ [74] in the statistical program R [75],
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1.8 Tables
Table 1.1: Small-boat fisheries population, sample size and response rates for mailed survey. 
Surveys were returned from respondents in similar stratified percentages as were sampled.
2012
database
total
Surveys 
returned: 
Surveys S e lf identified 
sent primary fishery
Surveys returned: 
2012-2013 
fishing year 
participation
Primary Fishery 1145 500 164 164
Lumpfish 142 (12% ) 72 (14%) 12 (7% ) 16 (10% )
Coastal fishing 460 (40% ) 115 (23%) 38 (23% ) 31 (19% )
Lumpfish & coastal fishing 114 (10% ) 80 (16%) 23 (14% ) 19 (12% )
Small-boat ITQ 206 (18% ) 94 (19%) 36 (22% ) 23 (14% )
Small-boat ITQ & lumpfish 133 (12% ) 63 (13%) 15 (9% ) 11 (7% )
Small-boat ITQ & coastal fishing 48 (4% ) 37 (7%) 13 (8% ) 9 (5% )
All three small-boat systems 42 (4% ) 39 (8%) 9 (6% ) 9 (5% )
Large-boat ITQ Not sampled 18 (11% ) 46 (28% )
Table 1.2: Mean satisfaction with current fisheries management by fishery type (median = 17, 
mode = 17, range = 7-33, possible range = 7-35)
Primary Fishery Mean satisfaction Number Standard deviation
All three small-boat systems 15.22 9 6.92
Lumpfish & coastal fishing 15.91 23 5.90
Small-boat ITQ & lumpfish 16.13 15 4.84
Coastal fishing 16.34 38 5.24
Lumpfish 16.75 12 7.52
Small-boat ITQ & coastal fishing 17.38 13 6.42
Large-boat ITQ 17.72 18 6.21
Small-boat ITQ 18.67 36 6.36
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Chapter 2 : “Little kings” : Community, change and conflict in Icelandic fisheries1
Abstract
Scholars of political ecology have long been interested in questions of access, equity, and 
power in environmental management. This paper explores these domains by examining lived 
experiences and daily realities in Iceland’s fishing communities, 30 years after the 
implementation of a national privatized Individual Transferrable Quota (ITQ) fisheries 
management system. Drawing upon ethnographic data collected over two years in the rural 
coastal communities of Northwest Iceland, we explore: 1) how the ITQ system relates to 
other complex social and environmental factors facing coastal communities today, 2) how 
attempts to alleviate negative impacts of the ITQ system have led to new rifts in communities, 
and 3) how the decision-making power of a few dominant interest groups in national politics 
leaves small-boat fishermen and rural communities at a disadvantage. In the words of our 
study participants, the Icelandic fisheries management scheme has created "little kings" in 
rural communities, where each little king acts in his own best interest, yet has no recourse to 
collective power and no platform to meaningfully influence national politics. In this volatile 
political situation with cross-scale implications, it is difficult for fishermen, their families, 
and community members to imagine ways that power over and access to the fisheries 
resource can be redistributed.
2.1 Introduction
“Do fishermen try to work together? Ha! No. We are all little kings.”
-Small-boat fisherman, Hvammstangi, 26 March 2012
Small-boat fishermen in rural Icelandic communities recognize the tension between the 
acknowledged benefit of organizing as a collective voice and the perceived need to compete 
with each other for individual advantages. The result of this competition between fishermen 
is often described through the expression “little king” (smakongur). Now a common term 
used among fishermen, political leaders, and community members, “little king” can carry 
multiple meanings, ranging from derogatory (e.g., reference to people micromanaging their 
surroundings) to proud (e.g., reference to oneself as a leader). Little kings are individuals
1 Chambers, C., G. Helgadottir, and C. Carothers. Little kings: Community, change and 
conflict in Icelandic fisheries. In review in Maritime Studies.
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who think they are in control, but actually are not, who are forced to act as if they are in 
control, or who are in control of a very small turf, zealously guarding it and thereby creating 
various obstacles for others. A little king is also an attitude that is portrayed through the 
inherently different interests in fisheries created by overlapping identities: community 
residence, quota-ownership, species fished, gear used, boat size, and so on.
Seminal work in the 1990s explored feudal metaphors in the discourses surrounding 
Iceland’s Individual Transferrable Quota (ITQ) fisheries system (Helgason and Palsson 1997; 
Palsson and Helgason 1995). In the ITQ system, the right to fish became a limited and 
transferrable commodity through the possession of a percentage (or quota) of a Total 
Allowable Catch (TAC) of a particular species. For many fishermen who were not awarded 
enough quota, the only way to stay active in fishing was to buy or lease quota from others 
who were given or had accumulated quota, and therefore be under the direct control of 
another for access to fisheries resources. A new discourse centering on these relationships 
emerged: fishermen became “tenants” (leigulidar) under the control of “quota kings” 
(kvotakongar, also called “sea lords,” sxgreifar). Today, the power imbalance that created 
quota kings is still present despite many changes in Icelandic fisheries and culture, and 
another new reality is emerging -  the little king, as both quota-holders and non-quota holders.
This paper uses a political ecology framework to describe the making and dynamics 
of little kings and their communities, under what constraints they operate in rural coastal 
communities, and how national politics and power keep the little kings in place, contained in 
their kingdoms. The manifestation of unequal power relationships and marginalized voices in 
natural resource management and the intersection of culture, environment, economics and 
politics are central topics of focus within political ecology (Greenberg and Park 1994; 
Robbins 2004; Zimmerer 2006). Exploring the interactions between actors in situations of 
unequal power helps to clarify and describe the uneven distribution in access to and 
responsibility for natural resources (Biersack and Greenberg 2006; Robbins 2004). Power is, 
among other things, the ability to control access to resources, often for economic gain 
(Jentoft 2007), and examples of the impacts of power imbalances can be found in virtually all 
aspects of resource management, ranging from the disenfranchisement and exclusion of local 
people from protected areas, to land appropriation for resource extraction (Robbins 2004). In 
fisheries, power inequities also often exist between scientists and fishermen, as scientific 
knowledge is often given greater legitimacy than fishermen’s knowledge (Finlayson 1994; 
Palsson 1998). Imbalances in political power can differentially impact those in rural 
communities who do not have equal access to decision-making processes as those in urban
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communities (Bavinck 2015; Fabinyi et al. 2015; Verelst 2013). The current trend of 
neoliberal fisheries resource management (Pinkerton and Davis 2015), such as Iceland’s ITQ 
system, can lead to the creation of new social conflicts and the further entrenchment of 
existing inequalities (Benediktsson and Karlsdottir 2011; Carothers 2010). Increasingly, the 
goal of rent maximization that serves as one motive for privatization of harvest opportunities 
is given greater legitimacy, and therefore power, over other social goals in fisheries 
management schemes (Breslow 2016; Carothers 2015; H0st 2015; St. Martin 2007).
As this paper will explore, the extent to which the little kings have been created 
through the ITQ system is not always easily determined - little kings also ascend as an 
outcome of other complex factors in Icelandic society. Therefore, before discussing the 
specifics of little kings, we first present results exploring characteristics of Icelandic fisheries 
and coastal communities. First, we describe how changing coastal communities are not only 
impacted by the ITQ system, but also by rural outmigration, environmental and technological 
changes, and other factors that are part of the complex local realities of contemporary coastal 
communities in Iceland. Second, we explore how the attempt to alleviate negative impacts of 
the ITQ system through the quota-free strandveidar season has in fact lead to new power 
struggles in Icelandic fisheries. Third, we review rural community members’ experiences 
with political power at the national decision-making level. Finally, we end with a discussion 
of the creation and maintenance of little kings through mechanisms described in the three 
results sections: complex changes in Icelandic coastal communities; the tensions in Icelandic 
society regarding the concepts of equity and power in fisheries management and governance 
that are brought to light in the conflict over the strandveidar season; and power imbalances in 
the national fisheries governance process. Little kings are different from quota kings in the 
amount of actual power they hold in fisheries politics. This paper therefore aims to tell a 
more complete story of the winners and losers in the Icelandic fisheries system, where even 
those small-boat quota-owners in rural communities who might be considered by others to be 
winners - albeit as little kings who have limited control - are still impacted by the ways that 
specific policies regarding fisheries access or decision-making processes have been put into 
motion.
2.2 Icelandic fisheries
The rich marine system off Iceland has supported centuries-long human utilization of marine 
resources, including fishing, whaling, seal hunting, eider down gathering, driftwood 
collecting, and bird egg gathering (Hastrup 1998; Palsson 1991; Palsson and Helgason 1996).
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Utilization of these resources has included varying degrees of commerciality. Before the 19th 
century, Icelandic farmhands fished cod during the spring spawning season, departing in 
rowboats directly from the land on which they worked (Kristjansson 1985). Fish stations 
developed towards the 19th century as seasonal farm workers moved closer to the best fishing 
grounds for longer periods during the year. Larger fishery operations accessing Icelandic 
waters at that time were limited to foreign vessels, mainly from France, Spain, and England 
(Palsson 1991). In the beginning of the 20th century, Icelanders began to operate their own 
larger boats with engines. The catch of demersal species doubled from 1905 to 1914, and by 
1930, 23% of the Icelandic work force was involved in fishing or processing. When Iceland 
gained independence from Denmark (in 1944), the development of fisheries became a top 
priority for the growing nation with access to few other natural resources. The ensuing shift 
from a small-scale peasant economy to a large export-driven fleet occurred quickly, and since 
then, fisheries have always been a matter of national interest (van den Hoonaard 1992).
In 1975, after incrementally increasing its fishing jurisdiction for the previous 20 
years, the Icelandic government extended its EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) to 200 miles, 
and asserted a right to exclude foreign fleets from that zone. During that same time, 
discourses about property ownership in fisheries emerged, centering on increasing national 
economic efficiency, and in the early 1980s, the Icelandic government first introduced the 
privatized ITQ system.1 Quota was bound to fishing vessels and was based on the boat’s 
average catch over the three previous years. The 1990 Fisheries Management Act created a 
comprehensive ITQ system that comprised the vast majority of species and fisheries 
(Arnason 2005). Under the Act, quotas were made freely transferable with minor restrictions 
on consolidation or transfer between regions (Runolfsson 1999), which allowed for the 
consolidation that continues into the present. Over time, quota rights migrated away from 
small boat owners in small communities to larger businesses in urban areas (Palsson and 
Helgason 1995), who, in turn, invested their capital from quota into larger and sometimes 
foreign businesses and banks (Eythorsson 1996). In 1992, the twenty biggest fishing 
companies held 36% of the total quota. By 2001 their holdings increased to 59% (Haraldsson
2001). Consolidation continues: in 2015, the twenty biggest fishing companies held 70% of 
the total quota (Icelandic Directorate of Fisheries 2016). The number of vessels and fishing 
companies continue to decrease, but those that remain continue to grow -  the fleet consists of 
ever larger boats, businesses accumulate ever more quota, and are increasingly vertically 
integrated, combining catching and processing activities.
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Many scholars have explored the ways in which the implementation of ITQs has 
remade fisheries systems in Iceland, with particular focus on how conflicts emerged in the 
system or surrounding the system (Eythorsson 1996, 2000; Karlsdottir 2008; Palsson and 
Helgason 1995). ITQs have also affected the economic and social structure of coastal 
communities as the entitlement to fish became detached from place and became the property 
of individuals who were free to sell their quota outside the community. As fishing declined, 
so too did demand for support services and processing, which led to further declines in 
population and local commercial activity as people moved away to find other income 
opportunities (Eythorsson 2000; Karlsdottir 2008; Palsson and Helgason 1995, Skaptadottir 
2000, 2007). Social relationships have changed in coastal communities as a new type of 
division between the haves and have-nots has emerged in terms of quota ownership, which 
leads to further unresolved political animosity among those who own quota and those who do 
not (Eythorsson 2000; Karlsdottir 2008; Kokorsch et al. 2015; Palsson and Helgason 1996). 
Inequalities between regions have also deepened as economic activity associated with fishing 
moved from coastal communities to the capital area where the quota kings are based 
(Benediktsson and Karlsdottir 2011; Mariat-Roy 2014). The relationship between fishermen 
and policy makers and scientists has also grown increasingly strained and distrustful (Palsson 
1998). Additionally, for Icelanders, the opportunity to engage in fisheries has largely changed 
from being a basic human right to being a commercial activity where fisheries are assets that 
are owned and sold for profit (Einarsson 2011; Palsson and Helgason 1995). Resistance 
discourses have emerged centering around altered social relationships, immorality, danger 
and greed. While legal challenges to Iceland’s ITQ system have been unsuccessful in the 
national court (Einarsson 2011; Eythorsson 2000; Palsson and Helgason 1995), the UN 
Human Rights Council recently ruled that Iceland’s ITQ system violated the human right to 
work. This led to the creation of the quota-free fishery strandveidar season in 2009 that was 
designed to support community development in regions with declining fisheries access 
(Chambers and Carothers in press; Einarsson 2011, 2015a).
2.3 Methods and study area
We conducted ethnographic field research in Northwest Iceland from September 2011 to 
September 2013 in the eight coastal communities in Hunafloi Bay and SkagafjorQur Fjord in 
Northwest Iceland (Figure 2.1; all field research, interviews, and participant observation were 
conducted by C. Chambers). These eight communities, ranging in population from 72 in 
Drangsnes to 2,600 in SauQarkrokur, represent a contrasting scope of dependence on and
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participation in fisheries that provides the variation needed to investigate themes of 
community, change and power. Over 60 interviews were conducted with 46 individuals to 
qualitatively explore their perceptions and experiences in fishing and fishing communities.
We first conducted exploratory interviews with key informants - individuals identified 
by fellow community members as being particularly knowledgeable about fisheries, fisheries 
management, and their coastal communities. The 18 key informants included fishers and their 
families, community leaders, processing plant owners and employees, as well as biologists 
and other research specialists. Informants were interviewed multiple times over the course of 
the research. We also utilized extensive participant observation during fishing trips and in 
small- and large-scale on-shore fish processing to gain first-hand knowledge of Icelandic 
fisheries and rural communities.
Purposive snowball sampling (Bernard 2006: 192) was used to identify 28 additional 
individuals for semi-structured interviews. Those individuals were selected to reflect 
recognized expertise in different kinds of fisheries, degree of engagement in fisheries, and 
knowledge of Icelandic fisheries in general. In many cases, we were able to obtain an 
exhaustive sample by interviewing all individuals of interest in the community. As with key 
informant interviews, semi-structured interview topics included personal history and 
participation in fisheries, experience of changes over time, relationship with other fishers in 
the community, importance of fisheries and fish processing to coastal communities, the next 
generation and entry level opportunities in fisheries and fish processing, and involvement in 
and perception of fisheries management.
Field notes and interview transcripts from audio-recorded interviews were first 
translated by C. Chambers, G. Helgadottir and E. HarQardottir, and then inductively coded 
for emergent themes in Atlas.ti and Microsoft Word (Bernard 2006: 492; Muhr 2004; Strauss 
and Corbin 1994). While certain broad themes were under direct investigation in this study, 
this style of inductive analysis allowed us to build stronger and deeper theoretical models 
based on the relationships between a larger number of themes (Bernard 2006: 492; Ryan and 
Bernard. 2003; Strauss and Corbin 1994). We found themes by exploring conflict, how 
individuals solve certain problems, social relationships, and similar domains that related to 
our research topic (Spradley 1979: 200). Exemplary quotes from interviews and participant 
observation are presented to give deeper context to the discussion of these themes identified 
through the coding process.
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2.4 “Left-over shells”: Community and change
The trend of rural depopulation shows little signs of reversal in Iceland (Bjarnason 2014; 
Karlsdottir and Jungsberg 2015). One major cause of this decline is the loss of jobs in the 
fishing industries that were central to rural coastal communities (Bjarnason and Thorlindsson 
2006; Stefansdottir 2010), a trend also observed in many coastal communities around the 
world (Corbett 2013; Donkersloot and Menzies 2015). As reviewed above, fishing rights in 
the form of quota were sold away from rural communities to larger, centralized companies, 
often followed by the closing down or moving of associated processing facilities and support 
industries. Over time, the market price of quota has increased so that small-scale fishermen 
are often unable to purchase or rent quota (Chambers and Carothers in press). Small-scale 
and part-time fishermen are particularly important for sustaining economies in small 
communities where there are few other economic opportunities, so when access to fisheries is 
lost, the individuals emigrate and the community loses crucial social, human, and economic 
capital, which further exacerbates depopulation trends (Bjarnason and Thorlindsson 2006). 
Although the link between the ITQ system and rural depopulation can be difficult to separate 
from other contributing factors, including regional and national cultural trends (Hall et al.
2002), rural community residents in Northwest Iceland assert that the ITQ system was the 
major cause of migration and related population decline:
When the quota system was introduced, the fishermen got quotas allocated to their 
vessels. This created a big concern for the nation since some quota owners sold their 
quota away, leaving middle-aged people that couldn’t sell their belongings and 
became prisoners in their own local communities. Everywhere you could hear the 
same story. The villages had depopulated, sometimes by more than half. What 
happened? The quota had been sold and the inhabitants had been left behind, with 
nothing to do - and the communities broke down.
-Processing plant employee, SauQarkrokur, 17 February 2012
The worst thing to ever happen to Iceland, excluding Black Death and the 
Mist Hardships,2 was when the quota was introduced, and made open to re-selling. 
That act has destroyed many communities in the countryside, including [my home 
town], a blooming village that had steady jobs for decades. There, the municipality 
sold trawlers and fish factories to [a bigger company] that later closed everything 
down and moved the quota away. Now [that whole municipality] is only a place to
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sleep for the people that still haven’t left after that. The quota that was never supposed 
to be sold away from any community.
-Small-boat fisherman, community name omitted, 5 October 2012
Views expressed by these informants highlight two important and related trends, 
consolidation and rural disengagement/depopulation. Although the above informant 
emphatically states his perception that the quota was not supposed to be sold away from rural 
communities, the consolidation through the sale of quota is in fact an expected characteristic 
of ITQ implementation (Carothers and Chambers 2012), the results of which are often 
misleadingly described as an “unintended consequence” or a negative side effect to small 
communities (Arnason 2005; MattMasson 2003). In subsequent sections, we review attempts 
to alleviate the effects of these unintended consequences on rural fishing communities, but 
first we explore the daily realities experienced by individuals remaining in coastal 
communities today. Employment in the fisheries industry continues to decline in Iceland as a 
whole, but even in the study communities of Northwest Iceland, historical and cultural 
connections to specific fisheries endure. Both large and small fisheries and associated 
industries like processing, on-shore baiting, and gear repair continue to exist under a 
multifaceted mixture of political, social, and environmental changes. Below, we use the 
examples of the communities of Drangsnes and Skagastrond to highlight and describe the 
complexity of changes related to fishing livelihoods experienced in rural communities.
2.4.1 Drangsnes and Skagastrond
The calendar hanging in the break room at the fish processing plant in Drangsnes lists 
the birthday of each of the 72 village inhabitants, and everyone in Drangsnes is, in some way, 
connected to fishing. In this small village with 13 small boats and one large seiner nestled in 
the harbor (Figure 2.2), National Fisherman’s Day (Sjomannadagurinn) is a bigger 
celebration than Iceland’s Independence Day. One young woman, Erla,3 had just moved back 
to town to be closer to family. Although she was busy taking care of a new baby and young 
toddler, Erla couldn’t stay away from the processing plant and accepted family members’ 
offers to babysit as a chance to get in on the action of the springtime lumpfish boom. She also 
helped her father on the boat and baited longline hooks back on shore. Her husband had never 
been to sea before, but started fishing with her father. This was his only option for a job in 
Drangsnes, one he felt lucky to have and took very seriously. As an outsider, he said, “It’s
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hard to get into fishing unless you are already in a family who fishes, you have to be 
connected somehow” (4 April 2012).
As was the case with Erla and her family, the presence of intrapersonal ties to the 
primary industry (fishing or farming) is a strong predictor of individuals’ decision to stay in 
or move back to a rural community in Iceland (Bjarnason 2014; Nilsson et al. 2012) and 
elsewhere (Kraack and Jane 2002; Lobley et al. 2010). Of the numerous and complex reasons 
for migration, the perception of reduced occupational opportunities through decreased quota 
ownership and fisheries opportunities plays a central role (Bjarnason and Thorlindsson 2006; 
Magnusson 2006). These two aspects considered together mean that as fewer individuals are 
engaged in fisheries, there are, first, fewer ties of younger generations to place-based 
fisheries that would influence the decision to stay, and second, fewer job opportunities that 
then influences the decision to leave. Fishing has traditionally been a family activity steeped 
in connection to history, and many current small-boat fishermen come from a long line of 
fishing families (Chambers and Carothers in press). It is a matter of pride for fishermen to 
know that they will have someone to whom to pass down the fishing business, and 
particularly the boat itself. Now, the rare luck of having an interested child to whom to pass 
down a fishing business is an exception rather than the rule. As one middle-aged boat-owner 
said: “There is a man with a 14-year old son who is going to stay here to fish. Us guys on the 
boat were talking one day, and one said, ‘Oh lucky, this guy. His son wants to be a fisherman’” 
(5 April 2012).
An individual’s “want”, or what for some might be more accurately described as 
“need”, to leave their home community involves a complex decision matrix, the weighing of 
opportunities only partly related to fisheries (Bjarnason and Thorlindsson 2006, Bjarnason 
2014, Corbett 2013, Donkersloot 2011, Kraack and Jane 2002; Lowe 2015). While quota 
consolidation leads to decreased access opportunities and family connections, technological 
changes also reduce the need for labor in the processing and catching industries (Skaptadottir 
2000), and general negative attitudes have emerged towards jobs in fisheries particularly for 
youth and women, who view fisheries as an industry without any upward mobility 
(Donkersloot 2011; Skaptadottir and Proppe 2005; Karlsdottir 2006, 2008; Power et al. 2014). 
Furthermore, many participants in our research expressed the common perception that 
“teenagers have different needs these days.” Personal choice and individual taste for lifestyle 
and education options are significant predictors of migration independent of geographical 
identities. Because of the ease of travel and communication, leaving home physically no 
longer means severing ties completely with friends and family (Bjarnason and Thorlindsson
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2006). The educational structure of Iceland also adds to the loss of youth from rural 
communities (Bjarnason and Thorlindsson 2006; Karlsdottir and Jungsberg 2015; Nilsson et 
al. 2012). After compulsory education is completed at age 16, youth in rural communities 
have to leave to attend vocational or high schools located in larger communities. This is 
similar to trends observed elsewhere in rural fishing communities (Corbett 2007; Karlsdottir 
and Jungsberg 2015).
Across Hunafloi Bay, a Skagastrond resident reflects on the importance of fisheries 
to a place like Drangsnes and the link to rural decline:
[Drangsnes residents] are so spiritual and strong... ‘I was born here and I will die here 
and I must fight.’ They have this mentality of keeping with the fishing, I don’t know 
how they do it. Maybe it’s because the people who wanted to leave have already left. 
-Community leader, Skagastrond, 18 November 2011
Skagastrond is a visible example of the complexity of changes in fishing communities, 
where population trends are often closely tied to the multi-faceted social and environmental 
aspects of fisheries (Figure 2.3). Skagastrond was built up by Danish merchants in the early 
1900s and the population steadily rose with opportunities in herring processing and fishing 
until the collapse of the fishery in the early 1960s. After that, opportunities slowly rose again, 
partly because the community invested in a freezer trawler and formed a local cooperative, 
and partly because of the general increase in cod fishing around Iceland. Skagastrond’s 
population reached its peak in the late 1980s (Figure 2.3), and has been in steady decline 
since quota became transferrable in 1991. Because of the loss of quota held in the community, 
various fishing industry operations have shut down over time (Figure 2.3).
Much like Drangsnes, Skagastrond is still known as a strong fishing community, and 
yet residents and local leaders worry about the trends of rural decline as opportunities in 
fisheries continue to decrease. The primary symbols of change are what a local Skagastrond 
community leader called the “left-over shells of fishing,” repurposed fisheries infrastructure: 
the fish processing plant has been refurbished as a laboratory for scientists, and the freezing 
plant is now studio space for an artist residency. The various changes associated with 
fisheries, however, can be slow, with delayed or unknown effects and are not always easily 
identifiable in population fluctuations. Many informants noted that although the quota system 
was a drastic change in fisheries, a suite of other kinds of changes in fisheries has also 
affected the community. Technological changes in boat capacity and design, machine baiting,
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and on-board freezing meant tremendous change in this small community. As processing 
increasingly moved off-shore and to centralized onshore facilities, Skagastrond lost land- 
based fish processing jobs, but gained employment though the purchase of a trawler. And 
perhaps most importantly for many informants, boom and bust cycles of herring and shrimp 
reside in many individual’s memories as major drivers of change (Figure 2.3). As one 
fisherman said: “If the fish would go this place would go too.”
2.5 “Where there is money there is envy”: The quota-free strandveidar season
Gunnar and his wife Johanna have plenty of experience trying to continue their 
fishing operation in Holmavik. They are an example of a successful small fishing business. 
Although Gunnar is an original recipient of quota and grew up in a fishing family, 
maintaining his fishing operation has not been easy. They employ about 10 people, which is a 
large operation for a small community in Northwest Iceland. Gunnar and Johanna recognize 
the importance of their business in the community. Creating jobs for locals is something they 
pride themselves on in their self-described role as little kings. They purchased a new boat so 
their daughter’s partner could fish and continue to learn new skills and gain experience; they 
also hire locals to work in the onshore baiting shack, providing an important employment 
opportunity outside the farming season. Like their counterparts in Skagastrond, they echo the 
importance of the ever-fluctuating nature of fisheries. “Like any good fisherman”, Johanna 
says, you “always have to be on your toes and ride the waves of new opportunities.” One of 
those recent opportunities has come not from a new species to fish or new market for existing 
species, but in expanded regulatory possibilities opened up through the strandveidar season. 
Below, we explore the reasoning behind strandveidar and the impacts it has had in rural 
coastal communities.
Strandveidar is an open-access, or quota-free, fishing opportunity that began in 2009. 
The season runs from May-August. Participants can use up to four jig machines to fish 
Monday through Thursday, for up to 14 hours a day or a maximum of 650 kg of bottom fish 
each day. The coastline is split into four areas, each with a monthly total allowable catch 
(TAC) limit. Once the total catch of the area reaches the TAC, all fishing is shut down in that 
area until it opens again for the next month (Icelandic Directorate of Fisheries 2016). Boats 
are typically operated by a single fisherman, who cannot fish in an ITQ fishery at the same 
time as fishing in strandveidar. Quota owners who wish to participate in strandveidar must 
therefore finish fishing their quota for the year before fishing in the strandveidar season. The 
intentions, and subsequent measures of success of the strandveidar program, are to increase
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accessibility of fisheries resources to new entrants and thereby increase economic benefits to 
rural coastal communities.
Following implementation the general consensus around the country was that the 
presence of strandveidar boats rejuvenated communities and gave hope for the future 
(Einarsson 2011; Halldorsson 2010; Mariat-Roy 2014). Major benefits of strandveidar to 
rural communities include the economic opportunities of increased fish processing, support 
services, and harbor fees (Halldorsson 2010). There are no residency requirements, only that 
fish must be caught and landed in the region where the boat is registered. Because of this, a 
fisherman can live in one place, but fish and land fish in a different community. Our study 
community of NorQurfjorQur is one such place. With only 52 year-round inhabitants in the 
entire municipal area, the harbor bursts with life during the summer strandveidar months 
(Figure 2.4), and residents, community leaders, local business owners and fish industry 
employees welcome the increased activity. However, with the general positive consensus of 
many community members and fishermen around Iceland towards the strandveidar season, 
there also exist undercurrents of conflict and insider/outsider dynamics between fishermen:
There are too many boats now because of strandveidar. They come here because the 
fishing is good, but we don’t want to share with them - they come from elsewhere and 
aren’t invested in the community. It’s better if  people stay here year round, not to just 
take off the top.
-Small-boat fisherman, Holmavik, 2 August 2012
Competition between fishermen is a common occurrence in fisheries around the world. 
The introduction of the strandveidar season has added new complexity to the way 
competition is manifested in Icelandic fisheries. As reviewed above, strandveidar is generally 
considered favorable, and a success, in terms of community development. On the ground, 
however, there are echoes of conflict between fishermen regarding the other major purpose of 
strandveidar: the opening up of access to fisheries resources. To explore the impact of 
strandveidar on individuals rather than communities as a whole, we used interview data to 
develop a typology of the popular characterizations of different strandveidar participants 
(Figure 2.5) and perceptions of for “whom” strandveidar “should” be. Below we present this 
typology with examples from various informants to explore new forms of relationships 
between fishermen and the act of fishing that have come into existence through the 
strandveidar season.
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2.5.1 A: No quota andB: Small quota
Hafsteinn grew up in the sparsely populated area near NorQurfjorQur, but now lives 
elsewhere and comes back to fish strandveidar in the summer. He learned to fish, hunt seals 
and gather sea bird eggs with his father and grandfather, but moved to a larger community for 
school and had not come back permanently. However, he had made a career out of fishing, 
and was very proud of that. At 36 years old, he does not own quota, but instead tries to make- 
do fishing lumpfish in the spring, strandveidar in the summer, and then, he said:
... after that - rent quota, it’s all you can d o .  300 kronur per kilo [$1.13 per pound in 
August 2012]. But it’s fun, and I don’t know anything else apart from computers. 
That’s what I went to school to le a r n .  but fishing is exciting. It’s in my blood like 
most of us [from this area].
-NorQurfjorQur, 7 August 2012
For younger fishermen like Hafsteinn who do not own quota, strandveidar can be an 
important part of the fishing year (Figure 2.5: A: No quota). These individuals either do not 
have the credit history or personal capital to invest in purchasing quota, do not wish to 
participate in ITQ fisheries for political reasons, or often have other on-shore sources of 
income to supplement their fishing activities. “Small quota ” strandveidar fishermen share 
many of the same characteristics as “No quota” fishermen (Figure 2.5: B: Small quota). They 
do own quota, and like those in the “No quota” group, strandveidar can significantly help 
individuals with smaller amounts of quota who switch into the strandveidar season once their 
quota has been caught for the year. For example, Gunnar and Johanna’s daughter’s partner is 
supported in the summer months through strandveidar, and under their help and guidance he 
intends to save money to invest in more quota in the future.
Like many small-boat fishermen, Hafsteinn had a vested cultural, familial and 
historical interest in fishing, and he stated that “strandveidar is only a few years old, but it is 
halfway there to give people some freedom.” This idea of having the freedom to pursue one’s 
own culturally-rooted fishing career is related to one of the original goals of strandveidar 
season: to open up the right to fish. However, this broadened access, while beneficial to many 
small-boat fishermen and fishing communities, has had certain drawbacks, as the following 
informant explained:
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The strandveidar season was intended to open up the industry to new entrants. Good 
idea... It was ruined by letting everyone get access to it. The ones who were in the 
industry already and the ones that had sold themselves out should not have been 
granted access to strandveidar. Those were not new entrants.
-Small-boat fisherman, Hofsos, 24 May 2012
2.5.2 C: American Dream
Many small-boat fishermen share the perception expressed above: that there are many 
current strandveidar fishermen who owned quota and then sold it, choosing to engage only in 
strandveidar -  a very different history than that of Hafsteinn, for whom strandveidar opened 
up an opportunity to return “home,” even if only in the summer. During an interview one 
informant spoke of a fellow community member who started fishing in the 1970s, and fished 
full time until he sold all of his boats and quota around 2005. He didn’t fish for about five 
years, but then purchased a new boat to fish strandveidar and therefore he “gets to come back 
in for free.” The informant noted, “It wasn’t supposed to be like that -  but these old quota 
guys know exactly what they’re doing.” The common perception that strandveidar is unjust 
highlights underlying concerns of fishermen about access to marine resources. Strandveidar 
is thought to first take fish from long-term quota owners who try to maintain a fishing 
business all year, and second, make it now possible for a fisherman to sell quota for profit 
and then return to continue to fish for free. One informant summed it up like this: “It’s sad in 
my mind, that the guys who sold the quotas are now fishing again and taking the fish away 
from others.” Strandveidar therefore creates a new form of conflict among fishermen 
regarding access to fisheries resources and the right to fish. As one community member noted 
regarding the differing perceptions of strandveidar and the negativity of some fishermen 
toward the strandveidar program: “Where there is money there is envy.” The new rifts 
created by the strandveidar season are symptomatic of larger questions of private property 
rights, the commoditization of fishing rights, and access. Varying perceptions exist as to who 
are, and who should be, the rightful owners of Iceland’s fish stocks.
Accusations of excess capital accumulation through perceived unfair access in 
strandveidar are extremely common among fishermen and coastal community members. The 
third category of strandveidar fisherman, “American Dream” fishermen (Figure 2.5: C) is 
therefore based on the popular perception that many strandveidar fishermen are motivated by 
the financial gain, or the “American dream,” of fisheries. For many current small-boat quota
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owners, strandveidar is seen as an unfair blow to fishing operations that have been difficult 
to maintain. Current small-boat quota owners are often individuals who have been engaged in 
fishing for several decades and who were original quota recipients (Chambers and Carothers 
in press, Halldorsson 2010). While it can be difficult to track the histories of strandveidar 
participants as the system and participants settle over time, there is some research to support 
the idea of the dominance of the “American Dream ” fisherman over the previously-described 
“Small quota” and “No quota” types. A survey conducted with the first season of 
strandveidar participants found that 40% of respondents owned quota, 64% considered 
fisheries to be their major profession, and 80% had operated a fishing boat before entering 
strandveidar (Halldorsson 2010). However, estimates of how much quota was sold by 
strandveidar fishermen prior to 2009 are unavailable because quota ownership and sales 
details were not collected. Similar research by Chambers and Carothers (in press) has 
likewise shown that strandveidar participants have an average of 30 years of fishing 
experience, suggesting that at least some characteristics of the “American D ream ” typology 
fit with information collected on current strandveidar fishermen.
Other than those former full-time fishermen who sold quota to engage only in 
strandveidar, or quota-owners who wish to make extra money, a second type of “American 
dream ” strandveidar fisherman exists. These individuals are what was referred to by many as 
“the doctors and lawyers from Reykjavik” -  people who have income from other professions, 
but who become involved in strandveidar to make extra money or experience a taste of the 
fisherman’s life. Although doctors and lawyers could certainly be classified as “new entrants,” 
those in rural communities often view these individuals in a negative light. As one small-boat 
owner put it, “strandveidar means that people who didn’t have any idea about what fishing 
means or is can begin to fish.”
While individuals’ motivation behind engagement in strandveidar may vary, the 
fishermen who sold their boats and quota before strandveidar was enacted could not have 
known they would be able to fish again without quota. Many informants suggested these 
individuals might have sold quota not because of greed but because it was the only 
financially viable option at the time and because they were worried about the future.
Similarly, those “doctors and lawyers” are making use of opportunities presented to them. As 
one informant who would be classified as a “lawyer from Reykjavik” noted, “650 kilo a day 
is not enough to provoke greed.” For him, strandveidar was certainly a way to make money, 
but also something he still had to work at and did not feel is easy money; he was simply
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making use of the options available to him to “try something new.” The accusations of the 
greed of both quota-sellers and “doctors and lawyers” that are specifically central to the 
“American D ream ” typology, while extremely common, appear to more accurately reflect the 
internal concerns and struggles of fishermen than a characterization of the strandveidar 
participants themselves. As one small-boat fisherman said:
I believe that strong forces in society want to monopolize all fishing in Iceland. One 
sign of this is how the regulations of strandveidar make things difficult. Already, 
some individuals feel that they own the fish in the sea; some quota owners even feel 
like the introduction of strandveidar is an infringement on their rights.
-Small-boat fisherman, Skagastrond, 18 July 2012
2.5.3 D: Icelandic Dream
The fourth category of strandveidar typology, the “Icelandic Dream ” fisherman, 
represents a departure from the first three categories of strandveidar participants because the 
only motivation of this type of fisherman is the pursuit of leisure, or the “Icelandic dream” of 
owning a small boat (Figure 2.5). Strandveidar is considered by many fishermen and 
community members to not be beneficial overall for newcomers due to the restricted amount 
each boat is allowed to fish and the cost of the boats, as the following small-boat fishermen 
explained:
Originally, strandveidar was meant to increase new entrants in the sector. I think that 
has not worked out as it should have. Many have sold out of other systems and could 
therefore easily fund their entry into strandveidar while newbies have to take huge 
loans. I think that they, the newbies, should at least be given more part in fishing.
They could for example be allowed to fish longer.
-Small-boat fisherman, NorQurfjorQur, 7 August 2012
It’s not possible to be in fisheries really so you have to do something else. You have 
to have money to buy into even strandveidar, and if you have money then why 
wouldn’t you do something else, like invest in a bank.
-Community leader, Hvammstangi, 1 September 2012
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Today strandveidar fishermen fish 30-40 tons in 4 months, this is not enough to 
create new fishermen. The system we have today should be called leisure fishing, 
since it is only an extra job.
-Small-boat fisherman, Skagastrond, 21 August 2012
The idea that strandveidar is in practice not good for newcomers, but at the same time 
should not be for those who owned quota previously has led many to consider it, as the above 
informants described, a leisure activity. “Icelandic D ream ” fishermen have the freedom to be 
at sea and take part in fishing activities that many still consider an integral part of Icelandic 
culture and history (Chambers and Carothers in press). Although many in the “No quota”, 
“Small quota”, and even “American Dream ” strandveidar participants certainly have strong 
connections to the lifestyle of fishing, these individuals are seen as at least still partially 
concerned with the ability of strandveidar to generate income. However, for the “Icelandic 
D ream ” fishermen, participating in fisheries as a “way of life,” retirement activity, or 
because “some men get depressed on land,” means they are distinct from the other 
participants because for them, strandveidar is not meant to generate an income or support 
continued engagement in fisheries. This categorization has a romantic quality often assigned 
to older fishermen, from both small and large-boat careers. Informants often spoke of “the 80 
year old guy who needs to be at sea or he will just die.” One informant put it this way:
I would like strandveidar to be the 60-plus guys who just can’t be away from the sea 
but who can’t work on the trawlers anymore. I love that idea; they could fish just for a 
few months in good weather.
-Community leader, Skagastrond, 16 November 2011
2.6 “Greed, gangs and politics”: Fisheries governance at the national level
The former government that associated themselves with a left-democratic policy did 
not have the courage to change the fishing policy. I was hoping that due to the poor 
condition of the economy they would increase the quota, take the income from that 
and then rent the quota out at a fair price and divide it in a fair way, but that didn’t 
happen. The new government will not change anything. The financial support brought 
to their parties is too high and weighs a lot when it comes to their election campaign.
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Do we live in a banana republic after all? Really. So I say, like this guy famously said
a few years ago: God bless Iceland!
-Small-boat fisherman, SauQakrokur, 20 April 2013
On 6 October 2008, in speaking of the banking collapse to a nation in shock, Prime 
Minister Geir H. Haarde closed with the words, “God bless Iceland” (Benediktsson and 
Karlsdottir 2011, Icelandic Prime Minister’s Office 2008; Durrenberger and Palsson 2015). 
The statement, as Durrenberger and Palsson (2015) note, uncommon in Iceland for its 
reference to God, became a tag for loss, meltdown, and surrendering to a higher power in 
uncertain times. The informant quoted above used the phrase to link the despair and loss of 
the economic meltdown with similar feelings toward national fisheries policies in his 
reference to Iceland as a banana republic with a powerful political elite and an export-based, 
single resource industry. Beyond the local dynamics of conflict between fishermen as 
discussed in the above section, there exists a larger-scale struggle between the governed and 
the governing body.
As we have reviewed above, fishermen in rural coastal communities operate under a 
complex mixture of social, political, environmental, technical and historical dynamics. 
Evolving fisheries regulations, such as strandveidar, bring new power relationships and 
conflict. Regarding fisheries at the national level, however, fishermen in rural coastal 
communities tend to be in general agreement with each other. They share concerns about 
corruption in the political system, unfair decision-making processes, and the focus on policies 
that ignore the needs of small-boat fisheries or rural communities. When asked what the 
guiding principles behind Icelandic fisheries governance were, one informant simply 
responded: “greed, gangs and politics,” and another: “The monopoly in the industry from 
year to year has created a powerful, small power-gang that take everything. These men have 
the government in their pocket.” The extent to which politics and power are engrained in 
Icelandic fisheries is often contested, although in everyday public discourse and even most 
academic analyses, it is accepted as common knowledge (Benediktsson and Karlsdottir 2011; 
Eythorsson 2000, Kokorsch et al. 2015; Mattiasson 2003). Below, we explore the imbalance 
of power in fisheries governance through the eyes of individuals living in rural communities.
Icelandic fisheries are governed under the Ministry of Industry and Innovation, under 
which the Marine Research Institute gives biological advice, and the Directorate of Fisheries 
oversees administration, compliance and licensing (see Chambers and Carothers in press for 
an overview of the governance structure and Kokorsch et al. 2015 for a detailed description
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of stakeholders). Although the Marine Research Institute is tasked with giving official TAC 
recommendations to the Ministry, this advice is sometimes not followed and TAC is set 
higher than the recommendations (Woods et al. 2015). This is possible because although 
there is no official venue for stakeholder input, lobbying by certain interest groups appears to 
influence the decisions made by the Minister. The most powerful lobby group is Fisheries 
Iceland (SFS: Samtok jyrirtwkja i sjavarutvegi), which was formed in 2014 as a combination 
of the Federation of Icelandic Fishing Vessel Owners (LIU: Landssambands islenskra 
utgerdarmanna) and the Federation of Icelandic Fish Processing Plants, along with several 
other industry partners. Other unions include the Federation of Captains and Mates 
(Farmanna og fiskimannasambandIslands), the Icelandic Union of Marine Engineers and 
Meal Technicians (Felag velstora og malmtwknimanna), and the Federation of Seamen 
(SjdmannasambandIslands). LS (Landssamband smabataeigenda), the National Association 
of Small Boat Owners, has considerably less power and influence, but is nonetheless the only 
outlet for the concerns of small-boat fishermen. The following informants described this 
unequal power structure:
It has been tailor made for LIU [now SFS] through the years. The banks provided 
loans for certain people to buy quota, the ordinary person can’t have access. Now they 
are forgiving the debts of these people. The big fishing companies pay into the 
election funds for some parties and then they want to get rewarded after the elections. 
The big fishing companies have total control in the media and they own them and run 
them. The Marine Research Institute is partial towards the big fisheries and the guard 
dogs of the quota system are in the universities where young people are indoctrinated 
to believe that the quota system is the best in the world. The technical training school 
is run by LIU [now SFS], there you learn about the quota system. It is not good to 
have the biggies against you.
-Small-boat fisherman, Skagastrond, 24 July 2012
Iceland is supposed to have democracy, there is no democracy in this country, and 
you are not even allowed to be an Icelander and fish freely as a small-boat fisherman. 
You get arrogance from the authorities, where people are demonstrating their power 
and working like some secret service. Small-boat owners are especially bullied, and 
it’s like everything is done to make sure that nothing is being taken away from the 
quota owners, who are in fact not the owners. The nation has been lied to, that we
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have the best quota system in the world, it is complete nonsense and it is only 
customized for the few chosen ones that think they own the country and the fish. Very 
few places have as much injustice as Iceland.
-Small-boat fisherman, Holmavik, 5 June 2013
And as the following informant stated, the quota system could be compared to the emperor’s 
new clothes, or a situation in which no one believes the benefits of the quota system, but 
assumes that everyone else does believe:
The quota system is built on the same grounds as the adventure about the emperor’s 
new clothes by H.C. Andersen. It was LIU [now SFS], along with politicians that 
forced the Marine Research Institute to take action, and they still do. Often the LIU 
[now SFS] gang behaves like they are their own state inside this country.
-Small-boat fisherman, Holmavik, 2 June 2013
Controlling groups with powerful rhetoric focused on larger fisheries therefore result 
in a situation where the opinions of small-scale or rural fishermen and the differing 
motivations for engagement in fisheries become obsolete in the streamlined decision-making 
process. Policies that favor larger fisheries are based on the end-goal of export to a global 
market focused on economic efficiency, rather than local consumption and production that 
may focus on other social or environmental values (Smith and Chambers 2015). Many 
fishermen in rural communities witness the incompatibility between the national goals of the 
quota system and the goals of rural development, as highlighted in the following comment:
Here all workers in the fish factory and the trawlers were fired and no one said a word. 
People were lied to and told that another ship would be bought while the matter was 
being put to rest. Lies! The company bought a 30 metric ton boat, no locals hired, and 
a small factory in [the capital area] was bought and all the fish are transported there 
on trucks for processing. Why? Well because the owners that inherited the company 
do not want to live in a crappy town like [here], and the rest of the quota is rented out, 
around 3000 -  4000 metric tons, so that these people can update their four wheel 
drives. This system is terrorism.
-Community member, Community name omitted, 12 February 2012
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Another example of this incompatibility is the perceived strict regulations on small-boat 
fisheries. As discussed in previous research (Chambers and Carothers in press), small-boat 
fisheries that are so crucial to rural communities are often treated with the same assumptions 
and regulations as large-scale fisheries. Small-scale fishermen recognize that their operations 
do, however, vary from large-scale fisheries:
It’s harder to become a fisherman in Iceland than anyone can imagine -  and having all 
your family depending on you when you go fishing under already extremely restricted 
regulations, that’s tough shit to deal with.
-Small-boat fisherman, Hofsos, 22 September 2011
Every Icelander has this dream to buy a small fishing boat and to go fishing but the 
government tries to erase that dream by refusing to really open fisheries. They think 
open access would be bad for buyers.
-Small-boat fisherman, NorQurfjorQur, 4 August 2012
Worrying about open access with small boats is like worrying that the women 
walking with the baby carriage will ruin the sidewalk.
-Small-boat fisherman, Drangsnes, 29 May 2012
The above comments refer to open access with traditional effort-based fishing 
controls as an alternative to ITQ management, and previous research has shown that the 
majority of small-scale fishermen in Iceland prefer non-ITQ alternatives for managing their 
fisheries (Chambers and Carothers in press). The inability to voice these opinions to decision­
makers, or participate in discussions that might bring beneficial changes to small-scale 
fisheries, is expressed in the common phrase "to go south" (ad jara  sudur), highlighting the 
tension between national politics and local realities. “To go south” is used when someone 
from the rural countryside physically travels to the capital area of Reykjavik for supplies, 
medical care, to visit family and so on. It can also be used when someone moves away from a 
small community for employment or education opportunities and symbolizes rural decline. In 
our research, informants commonly referred to their inability “to go south” in terms of 
participating in fisheries politics -  demonstrating the relationship of rural fishermen to the 
central institutions in Reykjavik. One ethnographic study in a rural Icelandic fishing village 
in the early 1970s noted the common usage of this phrase in fisheries politics, and the
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characteristics of the usage of the term still apply today (van den Hoodnard 1972). Both 
literally and figuratively, it is difficult for rural community members “to go south” and the 
phrase suggests an uneven power arrangement, where the periphery must always “travel” to 
the center. The 1970s ethnographic fieldwork was written before the large-scale adoption of 
the quota system, and in that way we can see that the figurative distance between Iceland’s 
center and periphery existed at least to some degree before the development of the ITQ 
system. Over time, however, this distance appears to have widened, and while small-scale 
fishermen and those in rural communities continue to express their views, there is an 
increasing pessimism about the ability to make a positive change for the future of small-scale 
fisheries and rural coastal communities in Iceland:
I am part of the group of people that thinks the original distribution was a mistake and 
it was probably the biggest theft of the Icelandic history. On the other hand, I made 
peace with it a decade ago, that probably it was too late to turn back and that the 
nation had to accept what had happened. But the ones who dare to point out the flaws 
in the quota-system have been judged beforehand and accused of wanting to do 
irresponsible fishing or have even been called communists -  probably by people that 
do not even know what the term communist means. Criticism can be good and it can 
be used to do good things better. Unfortunately some people see criticism as 
inherently bad and that it’s an attack on the individual or the system he stands for. 
-Large-boat fisherman, SauQarkrokur, 24 March 2013
I was raised by people who have been fishing and working in fisheries and related 
occupations. I have done most jobs on the sea from childhood -  I have been at sea for 
more or less 50 years. I have a lot to say about the quota system and I could give a 
long lecture about it, but I am now too old to be engaged in this bullshit. What I find 
worse is where my nation is at, to let these strong pressure groups run everything here. 
It’s sinister to think about. I have nine grandchildren and it’s impossible that any of 
them will make a living as fishermen.
-Small-boat fisherman, SauQarkrokur, 23 March 2013
The fu tu re , it totally depends on p o litic s , nobody can know. LIU [now SFS] is all 
about politics, and the small boats and communities are not always happy [with SFS’s
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political stances]. The trawlers have such big political influence and one minister after
another gets cold feet.
-Community leader, Hvammstangi, 27 November 2011
2.7 Discussion
Regarding fisheries management, a key informant said, “The thing is, you see, there are too 
few trees in the forest.” At first it seems as though the “trees” are fish, and that he is 
expressing an environmental concern about decreasing numbers of fish, or perhaps 
explaining how in the quota system he could not catch as many fish. However, this seemingly 
out of place terrestrial metaphor in fact relates to the most important land-based aspect of 
fisheries: the people. The “trees” are fishermen, and in the informant’s perception, there are 
not enough trees to make a proper forest -  a proper contingent of fishermen with a cohesive 
voice. The "forest" of fisheries instead is a barren and sparse place, with no new trees, no 
diversity of trees, only a few tall ones remaining few and far between. Although many older 
fishermen spoke of competition and lack of coordination between fishermen as an integral 
part of fisheries, they noted that there is an increasing need to form a collective voice to 
protect certain ways of life and fishing operations. The very nature of the forest has changed, 
and what remains is a collection of little kings.
The little kings in Icelandic fisheries today operate in increasingly difficult to 
navigate social and political circumstances. As featured in Drangsnes, youth migration and 
connection to community are largely affected by fisheries management policies, but are 
compounded by broader trends in education opportunities, lifestyle tastes, and technical 
changes in the fishing industry that reduce the need for labor. Personal choices and 
preferences are bound by very real limitations on occupation and education opportunities, 
creating little kings through this individual decision-making process regarding migration. It is 
becoming increasingly unlikely that informants’ grandchildren would even want to make a 
living in fisheries as personal identity and pride come from other, less geographically or 
lifestyle-based sources (Bjarnason 2009). Similarly, as highlighted in Skagastrond, fisheries 
systems and fishing communities are inherently entwined in complex drivers of change such 
as fluctuations in marine resources and advancements in technology. In this instance, a whole 
community like Skagastrond could be considered a little king, with some agency to enact 
positive change, but always subject to larger complex environmental, economic, and social 
changes in fisheries.
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Little kings are created through, and caught up in the complexity of relationships of 
the haves and have-nots in Icelandic fisheries. The overarching political structure in fisheries 
management and governance acts as a compounder that affects the intensity, direction and 
speed of changes in a system already in constant flux, creating new classes of haves and 
have-nots. Little kings engaged in fishing today are an entrenched social group where 
everyone wants to be their own boss, but at the same time is restricted, with limited control to 
respond to larger drivers of change. Small-scale fishermen and coastal community members 
expend time and resources defending their own niches, which leaves little time or resources 
for engaging in national political discourses. Furthermore, the lack of power to engage in 
decision-making processes, or to “go south,” in turn creates an ever-changing substructure of 
haves and have-nots within small-scale fisheries and rural communities. While quota kings in 
urban centers are the most easily-identifiable category of haves, subtler concepts exist. For 
example, Gunnar and Johanna’s quota ownership and general success may categorize them as 
haves, but at the same time, as small-boat fishermen, they are also under constant stress -  
grateful for new opportunities such as strandveidar that offer some hope in the increasing 
precariousness of small-scale fisheries. A non-quota owner like Hafsteinn would be 
considered by most a have-not, although some quota-owners in small communities would 
feel wronged by his participation in strandveidar. The fishermen and community leaders 
whose rural communities stand to greatly benefit from new opportunities like strandveidar 
paradoxically do not have meaningful power in fisheries decision-making processes.
Although many small-boat fishermen and rural community residents would agree on 
its economic benefits to coastal villages, strandveidar does not appear to significantly change 
the status quo of Icelandic fisheries with regards to access, ownership, and equity. Conflicts 
exist over ideas of proper “type” of strandveidar participant and the dejinitions are often at 
odds with each other and raise more questions that current fishermen and coastal community 
members are struggling to answer. Is Hafsteinn’s engagement in strandveidar a more proper 
or acceptable use of quota-free fishing than that of a doctor, lawyer, or former quota owner? 
Can strandveidar help sustain Iceland’s rural fishing communities? Is strandveidar for 
newcomers or retirees? Is strandveidar intended to support an already existing fishing 
business or a side income in addition to another career? Is the purpose of strandveidar to 
sustain fishing for leisure or fishing for profit?
Two themes are central to understanding the current manifestation of conflict in 
Icelandic fisheries: differing philosophies regarding access to fisheries and the ability of the
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governance process to address equity in opportunity and outcome. Because fisheries have 
been a market economy in modern times as Iceland pushed for independence from Denmark 
and even earlier with the trade of dried and salted cod, it is not market production and export 
that are the underlying cause of tension regarding fisheries, but the portability of fishing 
rights and their consolidation in the hands of a select few (Helgason and Palsson 1997). Prior 
to the 1960s, marine governance in Iceland revolved around the exclusion of foreign fishing 
vessels, whereas domestic vessels were given open access to all major fisheries under various 
effort controls (GuQmundsson et al. 2004). While there is evidence that the idea of ownership 
in fisheries is becoming engrained in Iceland, at the heart of the issue is the distinction 
between private and collective property (Chambers and Carothers in press). Although the 
majority of literature on natural resource management in Iceland centers on fisheries, the 
evolution of the private property structures of Icelandic fisheries management is similar to the 
development of management of land, water, and geothermal resources, which reflects a larger 
trend in Icelandic governmental policy design (Benediktsson and Karlsdottir 2011; 
Benediktsson 2014; Icelandic Ministry of Industries and Innovation 2006). While these 
resources were once held under common property arrangements, each is increasingly shifting 
to variations of private property schemes in the neoliberal era, although important principles 
such as “freedom to roam” (almannarettir) still allow for a public right of passage on 
uncultivated land (Nature Conservation Act 1999).
The concentration of money, access rights, and power in the hands of a few 
individuals through private property is at odds with the Nordic welfare model that guided 
much of Icelandic policy making in the past, where citizens are provided opportunities for 
productive employment that benefits their private lives, but also can be taxed for the public 
good (Holm et al. 2015). Therefore, these shifting governmental ideologies result in an on­
going tension in Icelandic society with regards to who should access, control and own natural 
resources. At the base of much of this tension is a disconnect in the concept of equity in 
access to resources. The Icelandic Fisheries Management Act says the fish are the right of all 
Icelanders (small-boat fishermen, as well as doctors and lawyers in strandveidar and big 
businesses) (Althingi 2006; Einarsson 2015b). In practice, however, neoliberal policies such 
as ITQ systems often ignore issues of equity (Pinkerton 2015), meaning that certain groups 
tend to gain greater control based on their positions of power. A growing number of 
fishermen in rural communities are therefore asking if it would be possible to imagine a more 
equitable fisheries management scheme and governance arrangement, where big businesses 
would not be on an equal playing field with small communities, where stronger policies
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would exist to support the equitable right to fish for individuals in rural communities 
historically dependent on fisheries, and where power-sharing would be a primary foundation 
in the fisheries decision-making processes.
2.8 Conclusion
Little kings exist as entire communities reacting to the ups and downs of 
environmental, technological and social changes, as family units trying to maintain their 
cultural and historical connection to fishing, and as individual fishermen making the best of 
economic opportunities to make a living. These little kings have no collective power or 
platform to meaningfully influence national politics and no concerted effort of resistance has 
emerged among fishermen as the in-fights between fishermen dominate, although research 
like this study shows that there are common threads for small-boat fishermen and rural 
communities around which to unite. Those in rural communities are distanced from decision­
making processes held in the capital area, and yet their world has been widened by politics 
and power over the years. National politics are dominated by a small number of powerful 
individuals with vested interest in the economic efficiency of the ITQ system. Although 
disagreement is not uncommon in natural resources management, Icelandic fisheries are at 
least in part an example of conflict stemming from unequal power relations in the ITQ system. 
Volatile political situations with large power imbalances like the current Icelandic fisheries 
governance system make it hard to enact new rules and to imagine ways that power can be 
redistributed.
A common topic of discussion in Iceland in many social and political circles -  
ranging from everyday citizens, to community leaders, to national politicians and planners -  
centers on the extent to which government policies should support rural communities, and 
how society is changing to favor urban areas. The various impacts of the sale of quota on 
small-scale fishermen, processors and rural communities were anything but unexpected, and 
although subsequent implementations of ITQ systems in other countries have attempted to 
include safeguards for small-scale fisheries and rural communities, early phases of Iceland’s 
national ITQ system had very few policies aimed at protecting those more likely to suffer 
negative and unequal consequences from the ITQ system (Chambers and Kokorsch in press). 
This research has shown the ways that attempts to counteract negative impacts of the quota 
system with policy making can in fact created new struggles. Shifting categories of a single 
stakeholder group labeled “fishermen” alongside of differing ideas of what a fisherman is and 
who Icelandic fisheries should benefit continue to stall consensus. Many large fishing and
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processing operations favor a national fisheries system that gives the largest overall benefit to 
Iceland as a nation, and do not support the ideology behind programs that give special 
allowances for smaller communities and fishing operations. This continuing clash in 
Icelandic fisheries is therefore rooted in not only the rules of the management system itself, 
but larger questions of governance design, stakeholder power, and national constitutional 
rights as equity issues in access to fish continue to be left unresolved.
2.9 Endnotes
1 Herring fisheries had been under a quota system since 1975, and capelin since 1980.
2 The “Mist Hardships” (Moduhardindin) were resultant from the eruption of the volcano 
Laki and the lingering poisonous gas cloud from 1783-1785, when a quarter of the population 
died due to crop failure, livestock death, and flouride poisoning.
3 All names of informants have been changed, and in some places the community identity has 
been ommitted to protect anonymity.
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2.11 Figures
Nordurfjordur
N=4, pop=37
Holmavik Drangsnes
N=7, pop=304 N_5’ P°P“ 55
Skagastrond
N=8, pop=389
Blonduos
N=3, pop=642
Hofsos
N=2, pop=138
Saudarkrokur
N=14, pop=2070
Hvammstangi
N=3, pop=452
Figure 2.1: Research communities in Northwest Iceland, number of informants, and 2013 
population of individuals over age 15 (Statistics Iceland 2015).
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Figure 2.2: The small but critical harbor at Drangsnes, population 55. Photo: C. Chambers.
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Figure 2.3: Skagastrond population changes and major fisheries-related events. Population 
data from Statistics Iceland (2015).
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Figure 2.4: The Nordurfjordur harbor, full of strandveidar boats in late summer. Photo: C. 
Chambers.
67
Typology of strandveidar participants
A: No quota ■  Combine lumpfish and strandveidar without owning quota.
■ Participate in fisheries without quota to make a political statement 
or for financial reasons.
B: Small quota ■ Those whose quota is so small that strandveidar can help 
supplement income.
C : “American Dream” ■ “To get rich quickly.”
■ Often have other careers.
■ Includes those who sold their quota, or who own greater amounts of 
quota.
■  Not necessarily motivated by greed, but view strandveidar as a way 
to make extra money.
D: “Icelandic Dream” ■  “Way of life.”
■  “ Strandveidar fulfills a dream of so many.”
■  Many begin fishing on big boats but dream of retiring and owning a 
little boat.
■  “The 80-vear-old guv who needs to be at sea.”
■ “Leisure-fishing.”
Figure 2.5: Typology of strandveidar participants, based on informants’ perceptions of 
themselves as well as fellow fishermen engaged in strandveidar.
6 8
Althingi (Icelandic Parliament). 2006. Fisheries Management Act 1990 No 38 with 
amendments. http://www.fisheries.is/management/fisheries-management/the- 
fisheries-management-act/.Retrieved on 27 Jan 2016.
Arnason, R. 2005. Property rights in fisheries: Iceland's experience with ITQs. Reviews in 
Fish Biology and Fisheries 15(3): 243-264.
Bavinck, M. 2015. Fishing rights in post-war Sri Lanka: results of a longitudinal village 
enquiry in the Jaffna region. Maritime Studies 14:1.
Benediktsson, K. 2014. Nature in the ‘neoliberal laboratory. Dialogues in Human Geography 
4(2): 141-146.
Benediktsson, K., and A. Karlsdottir. 2011. Iceland: crisis and regional development - 
Thanks for all the fish? European Urban and Regional Studies 18(2): 228-235.
Bernard, H.R. 2006. Research methods in anthropology: qualitative and quantitative 
approaches Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press.
Biersack, A., and J.B. Greenberg (eds.). 2006. Reimagining Political Ecology. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press.
Bjarnason, T. 2009. London calling? Preferred emigration destinations among Icelandic 
youth. Acta sociologica 52(2): 149-161.
Bjarnason, T. 2014. Adolescent migration intentions and population change: a 20 year 
follow-up of Icelandic communities. SociologiaRuralis 54 (4): 500-515.
Bjarnason, T., and T. Thorlindsson. 2006. Should I stay or should I go? Migration
expectations among youth in Icelandic fishing and farming communities. Journal o f  
Rural Studies 22(3): 290-300. doi:10.1016/j.jrurstud.2005.09.004
Breslow, S.J. 2016. A complex tool for a complex problem: political ecology in the service of 
ecosystem recovery. Coastal Management 42(4): 308-331.
Carothers, C. 2010. Tragedies of commodification: transitions in Alutiiq fishing communities 
in the Gulf of Alaska. Maritime Studies 9(2): 95-120.
Carothers, C. 2015. Fisheries privatization, social transitions, and well-being in Kodiak, 
Alaska. Marine Policy 61: 313-322. doi:10.1016/j .marpol.2014.11.019
Carothers, C., and C. Chambers. 2012. Fisheries privatization and the remaking of fishery 
systems. Environment and Society: Advances in Research 3: 39-59.
Chambers, C.P., and C. Carothers. in press. Thirty year after privatization: A survey of 
Icelandic small-boat fishermen. Marine Policy.
Chambers, C., and M. Kokorsch. in press. Viewpoint: The social dimension in Icelandic 
fisheries governance: How social sciences can help achieve sustainable fisheries. 
Icelandic Arctic Journal.
Corbett, M. 2007. All kinds of potential: Women and out-migration in an Atlantic Canadian 
coastal community. Journal o f  Rural Studies 23(4): 430-442.
Corbett, M. 2013. I ’m going to make sure I ’m ready before I leave: the complexity of
educational and mobility decision-making in a Canadian coastal community. Journal 
o f Rural Studies 32: 275-282.
2.12 References
69
Donkersloot, R. 2011. ‘What keeps me here ’: gendered and generational perspectives on 
rural life and leaving in an Irish fishing locale. PhD Dissertation. Vancouver: Dept. 
of Anthropology, University of British Columbia.
Donkersloot, R., and C. Menzies. 2015. Place-based fishing livelihoods and the global ocean: 
the Irish pelagic fleet at home and abroad. Maritime Studies 14:20.
Durrenberger, E.P., and G. Palsson (eds.). 2015. Gambling debt: Iceland's rise and fa ll in the 
global economy. Boulder, CO: University Press of Colorado, Boulder.
Einarsson, N. 2011. Fisheries governance and social discourse in post-crisis Iceland: 
responses to the UN Human Rights Committee's views in case 1306/2004. The 
Yearbook o f  Polar Law 3(1): 479-515.
Einarsson, N. 2015a. When fishing rights go up against human rights. In Gambling Debt, ed.
P. Durrenburger and G. Palsson, 151-160. Boulder, CO: University Press of Colorado, 
Boulder.
Einarsson N. 2015b. Marine governance, fishing and property rights in light of the
constitutional debate in Iceland. In Polar Law and Resources, ed. N. Loukacheva, 91­
98. Copehagen: Nordic Council of Ministers.
Eythorsson, E. 1996. Theory and practice of ITQs in Iceland. Privatization of common 
fishing rights. Marine Policy 20(3): 269-281.
Eythorsson, E. 2000. A decade of ITQ-management in Icelandic fisheries: consolidation 
without consensus. Marine Policy 24(6): 483-492. doi:10.1016/S0308- 
597X(00)00021 -X
Fabinyi, M., S. Foale, and M. Macintyre. 2015. Managing inequality or managing stocks? An 
ethnographic perspective on the governance of small-scale fisheries. Fish and 
Fisheries 16: 471-485.
Finlayson, A.C. 1994. Fishing fo r  Truth: A Sociological Analysis o f  Northern Cod Stock
Assessments from  1977 to 1990. St. John's: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 
Memorial University of Newfoundland.
Greenberg, J.B., and T.K. Park. 1994. Political Ecology. Journal o f  Political Ecology 1: 1-12.
GuQmundsson, E., A.B. Bergsson, and E. Sigurdsson. 2004. Development of fishing effort
and fishing fleet capacity in the Icelandic cod fishery. IIF E T2004 Japan Proceedings.
Hall, A., A. Jonsson, and S. Agnarson. 2002. ByggQir og buseta: Eettbylismyndun a islandi. 
Reykjavik: Institute of Economic Studies, University of Iceland. 
http://hhi.hi.is/sites/hhi.hi.is/files/B-series/Med_forsidu/Byggdir_og_buseta.pdf.
Halldorsson, G.H. 2010. Strandveidarnar 2009: Markmid, framgangur og fiskveidistjdrnun. 
Master’s Thesis. isafjorQur: University Centre of the Westfjords.
Haraldsson, H.L. 2001. Sjavarutvegur og byggQa^roun a islandi. Report for Institute of 
Regional Development.
http://byggdastofnun.is/media/skyrslur/sjavarutv_og_byggdathroun.pdf. Retrieved on 
7 Jun 2014.
Hastrup, K. 1998. A Place Apart: An Anthropological Study o f  the Icelandic World. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Helgason, A., and G. Palsson. 1997. Contested commodities: the moral landscape of 
modernist regimes. Journal o f  the Royal Anthropological Institute 3: 451-471.
70
Holm, P., J. Raakj^r, R. Jacobsen, and E. Henriksen. 2015. Contesting the social contracts 
underpinning fisheries—Lessons from Norway, Iceland and Greenland. Marine 
Policy 55: 64-72.
H0st, J. 2015. Governing Through Markets: Societal Objectives, Private Property Rights and 
Small-Scale Fisheries in Denmark. In Interactive Governance fo r Small-Scale 
Fisheries, ed. S. Jentoft and R. Chuenpagdee, 319-336. Amsterdam: MARE 
Publication Series 13. DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-17034-3_17
Icelandic Prime Minister’s Office. 2008. Avarp fors^tisraQherra vegna serstakra aQsteQna a 
fjarmalamarkaQi. https://www.forsaetisraduneyti.is/radherra/raedurGHH/nr/3034. 
Retrieved on 27 Jan 2016.
Icelandic Directorate of Fisheries 2016. Yfirlit uthlutun 2014/2015.
http://www.fiskistofa.is/aflamarkheimildir/uthlutadaflamark/fyrriar/. Retrieved on 18 
Feb 2016.
Icelandic Ministry of Industries and Innovation. 2006. Act No. 57 on survey and utilization of 
ground resources. http://eng.atvinnuvegaraduneyti.is/media/acts/Act-No-57-1998-on- 
survey-and-utilisation-of-ground-resources.pdf. Retrieved on 27 Jan 2016.
Jentoft, S. 2007. In the power of power: the understated aspect of fisheries and coastal 
management. Human Organization 66: 426-436.
Karlsdottir, A. 2006. Women’s role and situation in the fishery sector in the Eastfjords of 
Iceland. In Women and Natural Resource Management in the Rural North, ed. L. 
Sloan, 79-96. Nordfold: Forlaget Nora.
Karlsdottir, A. 2008. Not sure about the shore! Transformation effects of individual
transferable quotas on Iceland’s fishing economics and communities. In Enclosing the 
Fisheries: People, Places, and Power: American Fisheries Society Symposium 68, ed. 
M. Lowe and C. Carothers, 99-117. Bethesda, MD: American Fisheries Society.
Karlsdottir, A., and L. Jungsberg (eds.). 2015. Nordic Arctic Youth Future Perspectives. 
Stockholm: NORDREGIO. ISBN 978-91-87295-24-9
Kokorsch, M., K. Benediktsson, and A. Karlsdottir. 2015. Improving or overturning the ITQ 
system? Views of stakeholders in Icelandic fisheries. Maritime Studies 14:15. doi: 
10.1186/s40152-015-0033
Kraack, A., and K. Jane. 2002. Place, time and stigmatised youthful identities: bad boys in 
paradise. Journal o f  Rural Studies 18: 145-155.
Kristjansson, P. 1985. Cod-nets, boats and men. A study of the winter-season fishing on the 
southwest coast of Iceland. Seminarieuppsats E T  003. Etnologiska Institutionen 
Lunds Universitet.
Lobley, M., J.R. Baker, and I. Whitehead. 2010. Farm succession and retirement: Some 
international comparisons. Journal o f  Agriculture, Food Systems, and Community 
Development 1(1): 49-64.
Lowe, M.E. 2015. Localized practices and globalized futures: challenges for Alaska coastal 
community youth. Maritime Studies 14(6): 1-25.
Magnusson, A. 2006. Icelandic fisheries: Social perspectives.
http://www.hafro.is/~arnima/pdf/2006-itq-soc.pdf. Retrieved on 8 Mar 2016.
71
Mariat-Roy, E. 2014. When fishing means resilience: the evolution of small boat fishing 
practices in Iceland since 1990 and the new development of longline fishing. Polar 
Record  50(255): 421-429.
MattMasson, T. 2003. Closing the open sea: Development of fishery management in four 
Icelandic fisheries. Natural Resources Forum  27(1): 1-18. DOI: 10.1111/1469-
8219.00065-i1
Muhr, T. 2004. ATLAS.ti 5.0 [Version 5:]. Berlin, Germany: ATLAS.ti Scientific Software 
Development GmbH. http://www.atlasti.com/.
Nature Conservation Act. 1999. Icelandic Ministry for the Environment and Natural
Resources. http://eng.umhverfisraduneyti.is/legislation/nr/389. Retrieved on 5 Nov 
2015.
Nilsson, P.A., S. Arnason, G. Helgadottir, and D. Holm. 2012. Back movers and in movers:
A study of back migration flows into a small society over time. Hvammstangi: 
Icelandic Seal Center Report #0203.
Palsson, G. 1991. Coastal economies, cultural accounts: human ecology and Icelandic 
discourse. New York: Manchester University Press.
Palsson, G. 1998. The birth of the aquarium: The political ecology of Icelandic fishing. In 
The Politics o f  Fishing, ed. T. Gray, 209-227. New York: St Martin’s Press.
Palsson, G., and A. Helgason. 1995. Figuring fish and measuring men: the individual
transferable quota system in the Icelandic cod fishery. Ocean & Coastal Management 
28(1): 117-146.
Palsson, G., and A. Helgason. 1996. The politics of production: enclosure, equity and
efficiency. In Images o f  Contemporary Iceland, ed. G. Palsson and P. Durrenburger, 
60-86. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press.
Pinkterton. E. 2015. The role of moral economy in two British Columbia fisheries: 
Confronting neoliberal policies. Marine Policy 61: 410-419.
Pinkerton, E. and R. Davis. 2015. Neoliberalism and the politics of enclosure in North 
American small-scale fisheries. Marine Policy 61: 303-312.
Power, N.G., M.E. Norman, and K. Dupre. 2014. ‘The fishery went away’: The impacts of 
long-term fishery closures on young people’s experience and perception of fisheries 
employment in Newfoundland coastal communities. Ecology and Society 19(3): 6. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-06693-190306
Robbins, P. 2004. Political ecology: A critical introduction. Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing.
Runolfsson, B. 1999. ITQs in Iceland: Their Nature and Performance. In Individual
Transferable Quotas, in Theory and Practice, ed. R. Arnason and H. Gissurarson, 
103-140. Reykjavik: University of Iceland Press.
Ryan, G.W., and H.R. Bernard. 2003. Techniques to identify themes. Field Methods 15: 85­
109.
St. Martin, K. 2007. The difference that class makes: neoliberalization and noncapitalism in 
the fishing industry of New England. Antipode 39(3): 527-549.
Skaptadottir, U.D. 2000. Women coping with change in an Icelandic fishing community: a 
case study. Women’s Studies International Forum 23(3): 311-321.
72
Skaptadottir, U.D. 2007. Social changes and culture in Icelandic coastal villages. Arctic and 
Antarctic International Journal o f  Circumpolar Sociocultural Issues 1(1): 149-168.
Skaptadottir, U.D., and R.H. Proppe. 2005. Global processes, localities and gender identities: 
A feminist perspective on changes in Icelandic Fisheries. In Changing Tides: Gender, 
Fisheries and Globalization, ed. B. Neis , M. Binkley, S. Gerrard and M.C. Maneschy, 
152-168. Halifax: Fernwood Books.
Smith, J.G., and C. Chambers. 2015. Where are all the fish? Local networks for fish in the 
Westfjords, Iceland. Environment, Space, Place 7(2): 15-40.
Spradley, J.P. 1979. The ethnographic interview. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Statistics Iceland. 2015. Population. http://www.statice.is. Retrieved on 23 Aug 2015.
Stefansdottir, M.M. 2010. “I will never be an islander” : Grimsey, small island north of 
Iceland. Bachelor’s Thesis. Akureyri: School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 
University of Akureyri.
Strauss, A., and J. Corbin. 1994. Grounded theory methodology: an overview. In Handbook 
o f Qualitative Research, ed. N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln, 273-285. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications Inc.
van den Hoonaard, W.C. 1992. Reluctant pioneers: constraints and opportunities in an 
Icelandic fishing community. New York: Peter Lang.
Verelst, B. 2013. Managing inequality: the political ecology of a small-scale fishery, Mweru- 
Luapula, Zambia. Journal o f  Political Ecology 20: 14-36.
Woods, P.J., C. Bouchard, D.S. Holland, A.E. Punt, and G. Marteinsdottir. 2015. Catch-quota 
balancing mechanisms in the Icelandic multi-species demersal fishery: Are all species 
equal? Marine Policy 55: 1-10. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2015.01.004
Zimmerer, K.S. 2006. Cultural ecology: at the interface with political ecology - the new 
geographies of environmental conservation and globalization. Progress in Human 
Geography 30(1): 63-78.
73
This page left intentionally blank.
74
Chapter 3 : Multiple goals of fisheries management: A case study of the Icelandic lumpfish
fishery1
Abstract
This paper explores the Icelandic lumpfish fishery in order to describe the various social, 
economic and ecological dimensions of a fishery and then evaluates the capacity for 
participatory governance in the fishery. Fisheries are managed for a complex mixture of 
biological, social, and economic goals, but often, biological goals are given priority. 
Responding to a need for greater inclusion and measurement of social and economic goals, 
we use the lumpfish fishery to address how human dimension indicators can be collected for 
a fishery, and how the various indicators can be considered along with biological 
management goals. The small-scale lumpfish fishery has never been included in Iceland’s 
ITQ (Individual Transferrable Quota) system and therefore provides a noteworthy case study 
of fisheries management and governance given the overall dominance of ITQ fisheries. 
Results show that the lumpfish fishery is extremely important to the cultural and economic 
fabric of rural communities, particularly as a place for knowledge transfer between 
generations and a source of local pride. Participation in the fishery each year is heavily 
influenced by the landing price; however, permit holding remains tied to local communities, 
suggesting that management strategies must take more than economic or environmental goals 
into account. The flexibility to participate in the lumpfish fishery can aid in resilience 
strategies by individuals and communities to provide extra income, but at the same time can 
offer a social flexibility to access a fishery of cultural and historical value. Flexible 
participatory governance arrangements that incorporate social, economic and environmental 
goals address the relationships between the resilience of rural fishing communities, economic 
and environmental fluctuations, and issues of access to fishery resources that this research 
highlights through the Icelandic lumpfish fishery.
3.1 Introduction
Commercial fisheries encompass multiple complex social, ecological, and economic factors 
that can influence how management schemes are designed. Definitions of a “sustainable”
1 Chambers, C., C. Carothers, G. Helgadottir, K. R. Criddle, and A. Seitz. Multiple goals of 
fisheries management: a case study of the Icelandic lumpfish fishery. Prepared for 
submission to Polar Geography.
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fishery can vary and therefore prioritize different management end goals. Management 
scenarios that maximize ecological end goals (e.g., ensure ample fish resources for the future 
and minimize negative environmental impacts) may not satisfy economic goals (e.g., increase 
profitability, stabilize income, or maximize regional economic impacts) or social goals (e.g., 
allow equitable access for fisheries or fishing communities with historical and cultural 
significance) (Jentoft and McCay 1995; Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009). For example, 
keeping catch levels under a certain amount using effort controls such as daily or annual 
catch limits can fulfill certain biological goals, but may cause a race-for-fish that is 
detrimental to the social and economic sustainability of fisheries and fisheries-dependent 
communities or may exacerbate discard mortality when catch limits are reached and gear is 
abandoned. Programs such as ITQs (Individual Transferrable Quotas) can support economic 
efficiency end goals, but can fall short of supporting social goals related to equity and access 
(Chambers and Carothers in press; MattMasson et al. 2015). Similarly, opportunities created 
through management schemes that prioritize local participation and access thus meeting 
sociocultural goals may not succeed in minimizing adverse biological impacts or maximizing 
economic rent.
Because of this entwined nature of fisheries, for a fishery system to be considered 
truly sustainable it must not only maintain robust fish stocks, but also promote economic and 
social well-being for individuals and communities and the fishing industry. Known as the 
triple bottom line, or the 3 “E ’s” (Figure 3.1; United Nations’ World Commission on 
Environment and Development 1987; Anderson et al. 2015), the current model of sustainable 
fisheries management acknowledges the equal representation of biological, social, and 
economic considerations that are defined by the end goals of equity, ecology, and economy 
(Jentoft et al. 1998; Symes 2006; Symes and Phillipson 2009; Urquhart et al. 2011; Ommer et 
al. 2011). Although maximizing sustainable yield has been the dominant paradigm in 
fisheries management and although ecological end-goals have begun to factor in fisheries 
management schemes, consideration of socio-economic, or “human-dimensions”, goals is 
only just beginning to be factored into fisheries management (Pascoe 2006; Symes 2006; 
Urquhart et al., 2011; Ommer et al. 2011).
One way that social and economic factors are analyzed and considered in fisheries 
management is through the collection of various indicator data. A range of human dimension 
indicators in fisheries exists for specific fisheries or various scales such as household or 
community, and regularly-compiled human dimension indicators vary by country and fishery 
(Criddle and Makino 2012). Currently, quantitative data are more often used in socio­
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economic assessments, although tools for standardizing qualitative metrics are being 
developed as well (Jepson and Colburn 2013; Himes-Cornell et al. 2016). Commonly named 
indicators for human dimensions of fisheries include ex-vessel price, landings, landings 
value, income of fishermen, number of fishermen, number of permit holders, changes in 
export and trade volume and value, processor earnings, crew income, mental and physical 
health and occupational safety, training opportunities, permit and quota ownership, active 
vessel numbers, number of processors, and landings by community, as well as general 
demographic data such as unemployment, education, gender, and age (Pollnac et al. 2008; 
Lowe 2011; Colburn and Jepson 2012; Criddle and Makino 2012; Felthoven and Kasperski 
2013; Anderson et al. 2015; Pollnac et al. 2015; Himes-Cornell and Kasperski 2016; Himes- 
Cornell et al. 2016).
Although indicators are often used to describe trends over longer periods of time and 
larger geographic areas, indices specific to a particular region or fishery can also play a 
crucial part in understanding how social, economic and environmental changes in fisheries 
impact fisheries-dependent communities and fishing livelihoods (Larsen et al. 2010; Lowe 
2011; Criddle and Makino 2012; Felthoven and Kasperski 2013). Resource-dependent 
communities are often characterized by boom and bust cycles, but the diversity of marine 
resources often ensures opportunities or at least food for local consumption in periods of 
declining commercial fisheries, which can aid in community resilience (Robards and Alessa 
2004; Himes-Cornell and Hoelting 2015). A major characteristic of resilient fishing 
communities is therefore the flexibility to access local resources when changes in species 
composition, price, or markets occur (Himes-Cornell and Hoelting 2015). However, modern 
fisheries management regimes can affect access to local resources if fishing rights migrate 
away from local communities, creating inflexible regulatory barriers for residents who 
traditionally relied on the option to switch among multiple opportunities in response to 
uncertainties and environmental and economic fluctuations (Allison and Ellis 2001; Olsson et 
al. 2004; Lowe 2011). A reduction in fisheries access and participation is quite often 
followed by other political and social changes such as population decline and the withdrawal 
of services that in turn fundamentally decrease options for the future and lead to less resilient 
systems (Rasmussen and Hamilton 2001; Bjarnason and Thorlindsson 2006; Folke 2006; 
Robards and Greenberg 2007; Huskey 2009; Lowe 2015).
Indicator data can also offer valuable insights on local dynamics that can affect 
overall governability and sustainability of fisheries resources (Lowe 2011). Governance is the 
set of management structures and the underlying philosophies embedded in those structures
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(Poe et al. 2014). Sustainable fisheries are also predicated upon a flexible political 
governance structure that can respond not only to changes in fish abundance, but also 
fluctuations in consumer demand, associated costs with fishing, and other social trends 
(Jentoft et al. 1998; Armitage et al. 2009; Ommer et al. 2011). Fisheries-dependent social- 
ecological systems are inherently non-stationary, and inflexible governance strategies can 
make systems vulnerable to larger perturbations (Criddle 2012), so a crucial step in fostering 
the inclusion of social goals in fisheries outcomes is through the governance process itself.
Many scholars have focused on the benefits of fisheries governance structures that go 
beyond the typical top-down bureaucratic institutional arrangements to increase collaboration 
between various stakeholders and better address cultural values and social goals such as 
community resilience (Hanna 1995; Evans and Klinger 2008). Individual and community 
agency in the decision-making process is a key factor in enabling resilient coastal 
communities (Folke 2006) while participatory governance allows resource users to become 
more formally and directly involved in decision-making processes and to have collective 
power (Jentoft 2000). Literature focusing on various forms of participatory governance such 
as co-management (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997), adaptive governance (Osterblom and Folke
2013), adaptive co-management (Olsson et al. 2004; Armitage et al. 2009), community-based 
resource management (Kearney et al. 2007), and interactive governance (Jentoft and 
Chuenpagdee 2015) highlights the importance of power-sharing, the nesting of management 
activities from local to national scales, and transparency and trust in fisheries governance. 
Although not appropriate in all instances, the reduction of power imbalances in fisheries 
management through participatory governance can solve many of the problems facing global 
fisheries today by enabling the development of rules that support the complex goals of 
sustainable natural resource management (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Armitage et al. 2009, 
Cox et al. 2010; Gutierrez et al. 2011).
Best practices for fisheries participatory governance also include regionalization in 
the level of focus (Osterblom and Folke 2013), where the concept of community is an 
important aspect. Participatory governance works best when it is closely tied with the 
realities of social life at the community level (Kearney et al. 2007). Community is not always 
geographically defined, but can instead refer to a community of a specific interest group, 
such as participants in a particular fishery (Berkes et al. 2001, 205). And although there can 
be inherent power imbalances in communities, and communities themselves do not exist as 
one identity, participatory governance does have formal rules that add transparency to the 
process and decrease existing power imbalances at all levels (Jentoft 2000).
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This paper uses the Icelandic lumpfish fishery to explore how various aspects of a 
fishery can be considered to describe, assess, and monitor the fishery. The lumpfish fishery, 
like many fisheries around the world, is managed primarily for biological end goals, but the 
fishery contains a host of other significant cultural and economic factors that can affect the 
success of management outcomes. We therefore focus on human dimension indicators in the 
lumpfish fishery to highlight the complexity of the fishery. We have studied these dimensions 
through ethnographic field research and the collection of indicator data from government and 
industry sources. The majority of Iceland’s fisheries are managed through a nationwide ITQ 
system, where quota is traded between species, regions, and gear types, and where 
management decisions are made in a top-down organizational flow (for details on Iceland’s 
fisheries management history and structure, see Chambers and Carothers in press). The 
small-scale lumpfish fishery, however, has never been included in the ITQ system and 
therefore provides a noteworthy departure from the dominant paradigm of fisheries 
management and governance in Iceland.
First, we describe the current and historical cultural connections of individuals to the 
lumpfish fishery and focus on various socio-economic factors affecting individual 
participation in the fishery. Second, we analyze various indicators related to fishing 
communities and potential geographic variations such as permit holding, population size, 
landings, and processing facilities. Third, we examine how the current management and 
governance arrangements relate to landings trends and the overall governability and 
sustainability of the fishery (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2015). Finally, we discuss the extent to 
which the lumpfish fishery’s social, economic and environmental goals can be incorporated 
into a participatory governance arrangement.
3.2 The Icelandic lumpfish fishery
The lumpfish (Cyclopterus lumpus) is a North Atlantic species, commonly found both in 
pelagic and demersal waters from Canada to Norway, and when inshore, is often found 
attached to rocky substrate with a specialized sucker, or sometimes in floating mats of 
seaweed (Ingolfsson and Kristjansson 2002). Lumpfish come inshore from March to August 
to breed, after which males guard nests (Thorsteinsson 1996; Kasper et al. 2014; Kennedy et 
al. 2015; Kennedy et al. in press). Post-hatching movements, migration patterns, genetics and 
spawning behavior are all topics of current research, because many of the life history details 
of lumpfish are still unknown (Kasper et al. 2014; Kennedy et al. 2015; Kennedy et al. in 
press). The Greenlandic-Canadian population of lumpfish is considered genetically distinct
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from the Baltic Sea population, and from the Iceland-Norway population (Pampoulie et al.
2014).
Lumpfish were fished seasonally for local consumption for many centuries, long 
before the growth of the commercial fishery, which is thought to have begun in 1927 but 
substantially increased in the 1970s. The Icelandic lumpfish (hrognkelsi) roe gillnet fishery 
targets spawning females (grasleppa) and the majority of salted roe is exported as a luxury 
caviar-replacement item (Figure 3.2a). The males (raudmagi: “red belly”) are much smaller 
and have a higher fat content than the females and the flesh is considered a delicacy in 
Iceland (Figure 3.2b) (Kristjansson 1985). Females are almost never consumed in Iceland 
except for when they are air-dried (sigin grasleppa: “hung lumpfish”) (Figure 3.2c).
Iceland is currently a major supplier of lumpfish roe, following the 2003 collapse of 
the Canadian lumpfish fishery. In recent years, Greenland has emerged as a competing 
supplier. Exports of salted roe have ranged from a high of 1078 metric tons in 2010, to a low 
of 195 metric tons in 2000, and most recently 497 metric tons in 2014. Primary importers 
include Sweden and Germany (Statistics Iceland 2016). Roe was traditionally extracted 
aboard boats and the majority of carcasses were thrown overboard, but in 2012, Iceland 
instituted a compulsory landing requirement leading to the development of a market for 
frozen gutted lumpfish in China (Saulnier 2012; Vottunarstofan Tun 2014).
The fishery is regulated by limits on consecutive days-at-sea per license holder within 
a specified season (from around March-August depending on the fishing area), overall limits 
on days-at-sea per license holder, net length limits (75,000 m per boat), mesh size limits (10.5 
and 11.5 inch gillnets), specific area closures, net soak time restrictions (4 days), and boat 
size limits (under 15 GT) (Icelandic Directorate of Fisheries 2016). The number of boats is 
regulated by a limited entry permit system that began in 1987 and allows for permit merging. 
Permits are tied to specific fishing areas (Figure 3.3) (Icelandic Directorate of Fisheries 2011), 
but there are no set rules about the percentage of total permits assigned to any specific area, 
and a permit holder may choose any area at the beginning of the season. Fishermen may 
choose to begin fishing any time after the season has opened, and each permit expires after 
the continuous days-at-sea limit is reached. In 2015, there were 397 boats with active permits, 
another 20 with inactive licenses, and 37 with licenses on hold. Currently, the days-at-sea 
regulation is determined by the Directorate of Fisheries based on a TAC (Total Allowable 
Catch) recommended by the Marine Research Institute based on stock status estimations from 
the annual groundfish survey and projected catch-per-boat-per-day. Current research shows 
that lumpfish cover large distances and there may be some indications of metapopulations
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based on homing behavior, but there is effectively a single Icelandic population and therefore 
management under one TAC is appropriate from a biological perspective (Kennedy et al. 
2015).
3.3 Methods
First, to describe and contextualize the social and cultural aspects of the lumpfish fishery, we 
collected data from ethnographic fieldwork that included participant observation and open- 
ended interviews conducted from 2011 to 2013 (all ethnographic fieldwork was carried out 
by C. Chambers). Participant observation aboard lumpfish boats and in lumpfish on-shore 
processing in the North, Northwest, West, and Westfjord regions of Iceland (Lumpfish 
fishing areas B-E; Figure 3.3) was employed to gain firsthand knowledge and experience in 
the various cultural, economic, and environmental aspects of the fishery (Bernard 2006). Key 
informants (n=19) in lumpfish fishing and processing were then chosen for semi-structured 
interviews based on their knowledge of and participation in lumpfish fisheries. Semi­
structured interviews explored themes of familial connection to lumpfish fishing, 
involvement of youth and newcomers, importance of lumpfish to rural coastal communities, 
and involvement of fishermen in the management process. Notes from participant 
observation and interviews were transcribed, translated from the original Icelandic, and 
inductively coded for the main research themes in Atlas.ti (Strauss and Corbin 1994; Muhr 
2004; Bernard 2006). Excerpts from interviews are presented in the results to provide context 
for common themes that emerged through the interview process.
For the second part of the research, we sampled lumpfish fishermen as part of a larger 
survey project on small-boat fishermen (Chambers and Carothers in press). The survey was 
mailed to a random sample of individuals who, in 2013, were active lumpfish license holders. 
The sample included license holders from around Iceland. The survey was designed to further 
explore themes that emerged during participant observation and interviews and to obtain 
demographic information on lumpfish fishermen (see Chambers and Carothers in press for a 
full description of survey methods). Questions consisted of Likert scales, multiple choice, and 
open-ended responses, and were designed to test differences between fishermen engaged in 
the various small-boat fisheries in Iceland. However, the sample size of fishermen engaged 
only in lumpfish fishing was not sufficiently large to support statistical hypothesis tests. 
Therefore, descriptive statistics were used to highlight trends in survey responses. Finally, we 
compiled the following socio-economic indicators based on existing data from government 
and industry sources:
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Fisheries participation: (1) number of fishing vessels, (2) number of fishing 
households;
Fishing communities: (3) number of landing ports, (4) number of fishing
communities (defined by permit holdings), (5) landings by community 
and region, (6) number of fish processing plants;
Landing and economic trends: (7) quantity and value of landings, (8) landings 
price, (9) quantity and value of exports, and (10) Catch per unit effort 
(CPUE).
Because of differences in type and detail of data available, we do not present longer 
time series data for certain indicators (e.g. processing facilities, landings price) or correlate 
larger trends in the fishery. Instead, variations in indicator data were analyzed in relation to 
ethnographic and survey data to present a holistic representation of the various dimensions of 
the lumpfish fishery.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Cultural connections and fisheries participation
Lumpfish are present in a wide range of historical and cultural references and 
practices in Iceland. Around the country there are multiple place names associated with 
lumpfish fishing, and several sources show that from the 1700s there was detailed knowledge 
on fishing techniques and even rules in place to manage the amount of fish each person could 
take (Kristjansson 1985). Varied fishing methods existed, including nets, hook and line, and a 
specialized spear. Women and children would wade out from the beach to spear lumpfish, 
and this practice became known as “fishing on foot” (ad fiska undir fx ti) .  The fish were dried, 
cured, salted, grilled, or made into a cheese, mainly for local consumption. In some areas, the 
skin was used for shoes because of the toughness of the skin, a practice that lasted until 1915 
(Kristjansson 1985). Many traditional and modern songs and poems reference lumpfish, and 
there is even a legend that says as Jesus Christ and his disciple Peter walked by the beach, 
Jesus spat into the ocean and it became a male lumpfish, and Peter’s spit became a female 
lumpfish. There is a common belief that if  a female lumpfish is seen in shallow waters there 
will be a storm, and a person is said to be particularly lucky if a lumpfish swims up to one’s 
fishing hook. The fishery also plays a central role as a symbol of tradition and simplicity in
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the novel The Fish Can Sing (Brekkukotsannal) by Iceland’s Nobel Prize winning author 
Halldor Laxness. In it, one character says:
I have often pictured to myself at home the romance of [the farm ],.. how the lumpfish 
hangs from the spars in the fish-shed, pair by pair. [ . ]  I am absolutely certain that 
here dwells the true Iceland: the national soul, the national anthem, Oh, God of Our 
Land. [ . ]  No lumpfish is so good as hung lumpfish. My father always keeps hung 
lumpfish in the room where he sleeps. I sometimes sneak down to the cellar for a bite 
of it. To tell you the truth, I don’t think there is any other food than hung lumpfish. 
(Laxness 2008, 153)
Lumpfish remains a central part of the identity of many rural villages in Iceland today. 
The male lumpfish is culturally significant as a herald of spring and there was a common 
saying among key informants, “Life is lumpfish” (“Lifid er grasleppa”), which is a 
paraphrase of a more common saying “Life is saltfish” Our ethnographic data suggests that, 
for what has always been a short, seasonal fishery, lumpfish fishing maintains the status of 
“life” through associations with fun, family connections, and community pride. For example, 
survey respondents were asked to identify what they felt was their primary fishery and why. 
For those who identified lumpfish as their primary fishery, descriptions of fun and family 
connections to the fishery were very common, such as: “This is a fun way of fishing,” “I 
grew up doing this,” “You could say I inherited it,” and “I am a lumpfish man by nature.” In 
fact, the term “lumpfish man” (grasleppukarl), referring to the female name of the species, is 
notable because few other fisheries in Iceland identify their participants by the target species. 
In most other fisheries, one is simply a “fisherman” (sjomadur).
Lumpfish fishing is often considered a very different kind of fishery compared to the 
ITQ fisheries in Iceland, and this is partly because it is a seasonal roe fishery, and partly 
because many of the individuals engaged in the fishery are not full-time fishermen. Of those 
lumpfish license holders who fished in 2013, survey results show that close to one third were 
not engaged in other fisheries and those individuals reported that a median of 20% of their 
yearly income was from fisheries (Table 3.1). However, many fishermen who engage in other 
small-boat fisheries have experience in the lumpfish fishery. O f the 164 small-boat fishermen 
sampled in the survey, 63% had participated in lumpfish at some point in their fishing careers 
(Table 3.2). The survey did not purposely sample individuals who were crew members only,
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but of those respondents who had small boat crew experience, 59% had experience as a 
lumpfish crew member at some point in their fishing careers (Table 3.2).
The high percentage of small boat fishermen with experience in lumpfish, combined 
with interview data suggest lumpfish fishing provides for training, learning, and involvement 
of youth in ways that other fisheries do not. Key informants noted that lumpfish fishing 
presented a way to pass down knowledge and skills and, as noted above, a large percentage 
of small-boat fishermen obtain experience as lumpfish crewmembers. Informants described 
that as quota fishermen increasingly operate their businesses with considerations of cost as 
the bottom line, the space and time for extra crew -  who might make novice mistakes, require 
pay, gear and safety training, and simply take up room on board -  has dwindled. But, because 
lumpfish fishing is often carried out close to shore, and on day-trips with small crew numbers, 
novices and family members are more welcome to take part in crew activities.
Although many informants and survey respondents stated that there are opportunities 
for gaining experience through lumpfish fishing, they also expressed a common concern over 
increasing barriers for youth and newcomers (Chambers and Carothers in press). When asked 
the question “Would you advise a young person to enter your fishery?” survey respondents 
engaged in the lumpfish fishery more often answered “yes” compared to those engaged in 
other small-boat fisheries, but were nonetheless split on why or why not (Figure 3.4). Those 
who would advise a young person to enter the lumpfish fishery commented on the cultural 
values attached to the fishery, such as fun, pride, and familial history. Those who answered 
“no” stated that the decreasing season length, increased cost of boats, and low roe prices did 
not make the fishery viable overall (see also Chambers and Carothers in press). For example, 
in 2009, the price of small boats tripled as the demand increased with the introduction of a 
new quota-free season called strandveidar. Many informants felt that this made it difficult for 
new lumpfish boats to start up since the lumpfish permits are most often sold along with a 
boat.
Lumpfish permits exist in perpetuity, but need to be activated every year before the 
season begins. For example, there are currently 36 permits that have not been used since 2010 
or before, including four that have not been used since 1997-98. Although limited license 
permits were put into place in 1987, reliable records on the number of boats fishing each 
season only date back to 1997. Since 1997, participation has fluctuated from a high of 369 
boats in 2011 to a low of 144 in 2007 (Figure 3.5). A typical boat has a crew of one or two 
fishermen plus the captain, but many times two captains will fish together on one boat, and 
then switch to the other boat, so there is significant overlap of individuals between boats. For
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example, it is estimated that 650 individuals took part in the 2015 lumpfish fishery (Halldor 
Armannsson pers. comm.). But because permits are tied to boats, official time series data for 
numbers of fishermen have not been collected. As a proxy for the number of individual 
fishermen, we developed an indicator of the number of fishing households based on the 
number of unique addresses listed in the boat license database. Based on data from 2007­
2015, it is estimated that in any given year, 4-21% of all lumpfish households are multi­
permit households (Figure 3.5).
The anticipated price of roe is thought to be the key predictor of the decision for a 
license holder to activate his license (Olafsson et al. 2011; Marine Research Institute 2013). 
Our compilation of indicator data suggests that roe price and boat number indicator data 
follow similar trends (Figure 3.6). In 2011, for example, 369 boats took part in the lumpfish 
fishery when the roe price at the start of the season was 1050 Icelandic Kronur (ISK)/kg for 
the second year in a row (all roe prices are nominal and not standardized to reflect inflation). 
In contrast, in 2007, only 144 boats participated in the fishery when roe prices were 220 
ISK/kg (Figure 3.6). Using landings data, we found that from 2008-2015, there were 80 
boats that fished lumpfish every year (data from Icelandic Directorate of Fisheries 2016, 
organized by J. Kennedy). Similarly, there have never been fewer than 144 participating 
boats since official recording began, and informants felt that, because of cultural connections 
to the fishery, there will always be a certain small number of fishermen who fish lumpfish 
every year even with poor prices. However it is possible, given lower prices than those 
observed in 2007, that participation could fall further in the future. Nevertheless, even though 
the 2016 price (120 ISK/kg) was the lowest in recent history, 163 boats chose to activate 
licenses.
3.4.2 Fishing communities
Small-boat fisheries are particularly important to rural communities (Benediktsson and 
Karlsdottir 2011; Chambers et al. in press) and lumpfish fisheries are no exception. In 2015, 
the majority of permits (60%) were registered to addresses outside the capital area in 
communities with fewer than 500 residents (Table 3.3) and the ten ports with the highest 
landings of lumpfish were located in rural areas (Table 3.4). When the number of permits 
held by community is standardized by population, it is possible to see the relative importance 
of the fishery to specific communities (Table 3.4). For example, in 2015, the community of 
Drangsnes had the third highest lumpfish landings (Table 3.4), but with a small population 
size, Drangsnes residents held the most permits per person (Table 3.5).
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The number of communities that report lumpfish landings and that hold lumpfish 
permits fluctuates over time (Table 3.6), but there are several communities such as Drangsnes 
where participation in lumpfish fisheries is nearly constant. Drangsnes was of particular 
importance during the ethnographic interviewing and participant observation phases of this 
research, as there is an exceptionally widespread and special pride in the identification with 
lumpfish and relatively high permit holdings and landings as discussed above. As informants 
noted, “They say that people invented the lumpfish fishery here in Drangsnes,” and 
“Everybody knows the best lumpfish are in Hunafloi Bay.” Tagging data suggests that the 
west coast of Hunafloi Bay (fishing area D, Figure 3.1) where Drangsnes is situated appears 
to be one of the most important areas for lumpfish, along with Stykkisholmur in fishing area 
B and Raufarhofn in fishing area E (Kennedy et al. 2015). Although these places are lumpfish 
hotspots with good breeding grounds, landings by area do not necessarily mirror population 
abundance and can vary slightly by year (Figure 3.7). For example, the greatest percentage of 
the total landings is often in fishing area E, but in 2010, landings were highest in area B 
(Figure 3.7).
Permit ownership is not tied to community, so a permit can be held by a community 
member residing in one fishing area, but be valid for a different fishing area, and there are no 
limits on the number of permits allowed to be assigned to any specific fishing area. Therefore, 
after the high landings in area B in 2010, many fishermen chose to move their permits to area 
B in 2011 (Figure 3.8). Other than this example, however, there are no identifiable trends in 
the percentages of permits assigned to particular areas from 2007-2015. The percentage of 
permits held by fishing area also remains relatively stable (Figure 3.9), indicating that the 
presence of the permit flexibility allowances does not affect the concentration of permit 
holding by larger urban communities or the concentration of fishing activity by fishing area.
Processing is also a major part of the importance of lumpfish to communities. 
Especially after the landing of the whole fish became mandatory in 2012, the link between 
lumpfish fishing and onshore processing has grown stronger through the creation of new 
land-based processing jobs (Saulnier 2012, Vottunarstofan Tun 2014). These extra onshore 
jobs add to the excitement around the lumpfish season, as the following informant explained:
Lumpfish is different, everybody wants to have fun and I want to be around people 
after the winter. It’s nice, everybody gets excited and they hire more people during 
this time. (Processing plant employee, Drangsnes, 4 April 2012).
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Long-term data do not exist for the number of processors in either roe or frozen 
lumpfish, but it was estimated that in 2015 there were 10 large and 5 small processing 
companies that worked on lumpfish. Records from 2016 indicate that there are 19 lumpfish 
processors in 13 communities (Figure 3.10).
3.4.3 Landing and economic trends, management and governance
Although indicators for participation by community do not show major fluctuations, 
total lumpfish landings have varied greatly, from a high of 12,000 metric tons of whole body 
mass in 1984 to a low of 2,500 metric tons in 2000 (Marine Research Institute 2015) (Figure 
3.11). For data obtained prior to the mandatory landing of the whole body, whole body mass 
is calculated by multiplying roe mass by four (Vottunarstofan Tun 2014). In 2010, lumpfish 
landings were 8,000 metric tons, the highest since 1987 and 50% more than in 2009. Because 
the fishery is primarily for export, the variations in the value produced in the fishery are tied 
to the amount landed (Figure 3.11), and the export quantity varies with landings (Figure 3.12). 
However, the increased export of whole frozen bodies has not created a significant change in 
the overall value of lumpfish export (Figure 3.13) or an increase in landings (Figure 3.11).
The biomass index and CPUE for lumpfish fluctuate as well. The biomass index 
increased from a low in 2000 until 2007, and then showed a decreasing trend until 2013. 
Similarly, CPUE reached a high in 2007, a low in 2011, and has been on an upward trend 
since (Marine Research Institute 2015) (Figure 3.14). There was some cause for concern with 
decreasing biomass and CPUE from around 2007-2013, but overall the lumpfish fishery 
management system is generally thought to have realized good outcomes (Vottunarstofan 
Tun 2014). The fishery performance is evaluated through the biomass index and the 
management goal is to keep fishing mortality (Fproxy) below the average from the reference 
period 1985-2011. The Marine Research Institute then recommends a TAC based on the 
calculation of fishing mortality; this TAC is then converted to days-at-sea by the Directorate 
of Fisheries. The days-at-sea limit decreased in 2013 from 50 to 32 days because the 2012 
landings far exceeded the Marine Research Institute’s recommended TAC (Vottunarstofan 
Tun 2014).
The lumpfish fishery is different from all other small-boat fisheries in Iceland because 
the season does not involve large boats and the resource itself is not formally accessed in 
another season or fishery (although there can be bycatch of lumpfish in trawl fisheries). 
Small-boat interests therefore have sole influence in the fisheries management decisions. The 
Marine Research Institute and Directorate of Fisheries give official advice and set regulations,
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but the National Association of Small-Boat Owners (NASBO) has a strong consultancy status 
in the decision-making process. There is a fishermen’s lumpfish committee with 
representatives from all over Iceland, and this group plus the NASBO representatives actively 
participates in international meetings with producers and buyers, and hold discussions on 
fishing and regulatory advice with the Marine Research Institute and the Directorate of 
Fisheries (Vottunarstofan Tun 2014). The major concern for NASBO is the roe price, which 
has been low for several years. In fact, NASBO requested a reduction from 32 to 28 days-at 
sea in 2014, out of concern that large landings volumes could flood the market with roe and 
further depress price and earnings for the fishermen and communities that rely on lumpfish 
fisheries. However, this recommendation was not accepted by the Directorate of Fisheries.
Despite being represented by the NASBO, survey results suggest that lumpfish 
fishermen are no different from other small-boat fishermen in feeling disengaged from the 
management process (Chambers and Carothers in press). Based on ethnographic data, we 
suggest that the low satisfaction with management is an overall reaction to the ITQ system 
and the governance arrangement in Iceland, rather than a reflection of the specifics of the 
lumpfish fishery itself, and that because of the small number of fishermen engaged solely in 
the lumpfish fishery, it was not easy to differentiate satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
management of the lumpfish fishery from overall dissatisfaction with the management of ITQ 
fisheries. In addition, there is an ever-present concern that lumpfish will be incorporated into 
the ITQ system and a sense of loss of control that was present in interviews and surveys 
responses. As one key informant said:
There are some folks who want there to be lumpfish quota. I think they just want to
make m o n e y , hope it will never happen. They just want to sell the quota. The people
don’t have control over lumpfish anymore.
The feeling of decreasing control is related to the low roe price, worries about the 
assimilation of lumpfish into the ITQ system, and also external pressure caused by the recent 
Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certification (Vottunarstofan Tun 2014). The 2015 
season was the first year the fishery had been MSC certified, and to comply with certification 
guidelines, the fishery must not go over the TAC recommended by the Marine Research 
Institute. As one fisherman put it, with MSC, “it’s like w e’re almost into quota now.” This 
increased emphasis placed on adhering to a TAC through days-at-sea regulations is troubling 
to many fishermen because of the perceived lack of knowledge regarding lumpfish
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population dynamics. Lumpfish exhibit both demersal and pelagic behavior (Kennedy et al.
2015), so fishermen question the methods used by the Marine Research Institute to estimate 
TAC that are based on trawl surveys. Lumpfish is not considered a key Icelandic marine 
ecosystem species (Valdimarsson and Jonsson 2007), however, as one fisherman said, “Even 
little lumpfish is far too complicated to isolate to one type of science.” Many fishermen 
expressed interest in collaborating more with scientists and sharing their knowledge.
3.5 Concluding discussion
The lumpfish fishery is one example of a culturally and historically significant fishery 
that continues to play an important part in individual fishermen’s identity and the local 
identity of many fishing villages in Iceland. The individual decision to participate in the 
lumpfish fishery in any given year is heavily influenced by roe price. However, there is a 
core group of people strongly connected to this fishery as an intrinsic part of their lifestyle. 
Although there is always uncertainty related to global markets and environmental fluctuations, 
motivations other than monetary gain, such as community pride and tradition play a strong 
role in the decision to participate in the fishery.
The lumpfish fishery does not factor highly in overall landings or fisheries-generated 
revenue in Iceland, but does contribute to local identity, autonomy and access to fisheries 
resources. Lumpfish could therefore be considered a cultural keystone: a species of particular 
importance to the social system of a community and cultural identity (Poe et al. 2014, 
Garibaldi and Turner 2004). Although the concept of cultural keystone species strays from 
the ecosystem based fisheries management model, it is also helpful in considering that not all 
marine resources are equal, and that social-ecological systems have differential meanings 
attached to specific resources (Broch 2013). Indicator data showed that permit ownership 
remains local and although landings fluctuate by area and time, permits have not accumulated 
in urban areas over time. Lumpfish fishing therefore stays tied to place, because of resource 
availability and the distribution of the fish stock, and because of the continuation of permit 
holding by local residents based on cultural ties to the fishery. Cultural keystones like 
lumpfish therefore demand key consideration in management models.
Permit holding can be an important predictor of community and individual resilience 
(Lowe 2011; Broch 2013). The most resilient coastal communities may be those that 
diversify outside of fisheries (Magis 2010), however, the continued local access to marine 
resources can provide an important economic buffer and provide continued autonomy for 
communities whose cultural and historical identities are intimately linked with fisheries. As
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discussed above, although lumpfish fishing is not generally understood to be an entry-level 
fishing opportunity because the start-up costs can be prohibitive, it can still provide important 
continued access to marine resources for crew members and part-time fishermen in coastal 
communities. Access rights to the majority of fisheries in Iceland continue to consolidate in 
the ITQ system, so Iceland’s small-scale, non-ITQ fisheries like lumpfish offer a certain 
flexibility for those who rely on fisheries for part-time or seasonal income. When permit 
holders choose to activate their license, they bring added income to their families and extra 
activity to processing facilities in local communities. While access to lumpfish can be a 
source of resilience through additional income to fishermen and communities, flexible 
livelihood strategies for resilience must not only consider economic options. Lumpfish 
fishermen also build the resiliency of their communities when they have the flexibility to 
participate in a fishery that provides access to a culturally important livelihood activity, for 
themselves and for the next generation.
Sustainable fisheries management is contingent upon multiple factors and is 
inherently connected with a flexible governance arrangement. The lumpfish fishery is the 
closest thing to participatory fisheries governance in Iceland and a good example of the 
possibility of well-controlled fisheries, particularly in small-scale fisheries where 
participation is only partially driven by economic concerns. Interview and participant 
observation data suggest that respondents see more opportunities for lumpfish fishermen to 
be involved in the management process than for ITQ fishermen to be involved in the 
management process. At the same time, current fishermen wish to have their ecological 
knowledge and opinions on how to manage the fishery better considered in management 
decisions. Although it is difficult for the Marine Research Institute to have control over total 
fishing effort since they do not know who will be fishing before the season starts, the days-at- 
sea regulation appears to be successful. However, a more flexible form of participatory 
governance would serve both fisheries managers and fishermen alike by creating a decision­
making platform that could respond to uncertainties in lumpfish roe markets and fishermen 
boat participation with increased collaboration between fishermen and the governing body. 
Several factors known to be associated with successful participatory governance scenarios are 
already present in the Icelandic lumpfish fishery such as multiple knowledge systems, clear 
property rights, and a small-scale fishery (Armitage et al. 2009), thus a more clearly 
formalized participatory governance structure would serve to further minimize uncertainty 
and foster collaboration.
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By focusing on the lumpfish fishery in Iceland, this research has shown the 
complexity of the social, economic and environmental aspects of a single fishery. The data 
presented in this paper lay the groundwork for the development of further indicator metrics 
for the lumpfish fishery. A number of data gaps exist for human dimension factors in the 
lumpfish fishery, such as: number of full and part-time fishermen and crew, income or 
individual earnings, and processors. Additionally, the establishment of long-term data sets 
based on qualitative data would aid in measuring certain aspects of community well-being 
and resilience that can be important factors in assessing the performance of a fishery. 
Although this research has focused on a specific fishery because of its distinct management 
arrangements, the majority of lumpfish fishermen are engaged in other fisheries and no 
fishery exists in a bubble. Considering lumpfish alone in a single species management 
approach is in contrast with the trend and call for ecosystem-based fisheries management. 
Over time, the complex metrics presented here should be collected for a broader range of 
fisheries and communities in Iceland and included in ecosystem based fishery management 
considerations or other forms of sustainable fisheries management that include concepts of 
linked social-ecological systems. Understanding the interplay of social and environmental 
factors and their related management end goals and governance process is crucial in 
supporting truly sustainable fisheries in complex marine socio-ecological systems.
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3.7 Figures
Economy / Ecology
Growth I Biodiversity \
Efficiency Carrying capacity
\ Productivity |i Ecosystem integrity /
Sustainability
Equity
\ Cultural identity /
\  Accessibility /
\  Empowerment /
Figure 3.1: The triple bottom line, or 3 “E’s” of sustainability. Modified from UN World 
Commission on Environment and Development (1987).
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Figure 3.2: (a) Barrels of salted roe, Photo: O. Bernodusson, Ljosmyndasafn Skagastrandar.
(b) Sexual dimorphism in lumpfish, Photo: National Association o f Small-Boat Owners, (c) 
Hung female lumpfish, Photo: O. Bernodusson, Ljosmyndasafn Skagastrandar.
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_Figure 3.3: Lumpfish fishing regulatory areas, map modified from the Icelandic Directorate 
of Fisheries (2016).
Lumpfish Others
Figure 3.4: Lumpfish fishermen (both lumpfish only and combined with other fisheries) 
compared to non-lumpfish fishermen response to “Would you advise a young person to enter 
your fishery?” (Pearson %2 = 7.2556,/? = 0.007)
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Figure 3.5: Number of boats participating in the lumpfish fishery, 1997-2015 (data from 
Marine Research Institute 2015 and Icelandic Directorate of Fisheries 2016).
idC/3
Figure 3.6: Number of boats and price of roe in Icelandic Kronur(ISK)/kg, 2007-2013 (data 
from National Association of Small-Boat Owners 2016).
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Figure 3.7: Percentage of landings by fishing area, 2007-2015 (data from Icelandic 
Directorate of Fisheries 2016, organized by J. Kennedy).
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Figure 3.8: Percentage of permits assigned to fishing areas, 2007-2015 (data from Icelandic 
Directorate of Fisheries 2016).
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Figure 3.9: Percentage of permits held by fishing areas, 2007-2015 (data from Icelandic 
Directorate of Fisheries 2016).
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Figure 3.10: Lumpfish processing plants, 2016 (data from Icelandic Food and Veterinary 
Authority, 2016).
98
Figure 3.11: Landings and value (Icelandic Kronur: ISK) in the lumpfish fishery, 1990-2014 
(Statistics Iceland 2016).
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Figure 3.12: Export in metric tons of whole frozen lumpfish and salted roe, 1999-2014 
(Statistics Iceland 2016).
Figure 3.13: Export value of whole frozen lumpfish and salted roe (Icelandic Kronur: ISK), 
1999-2014 (Statistics Iceland 2016).
100
.o
s
_s"3
[7
£o
55
Visitala SMB (Biomass index SMB)
• • • • Afli a soknareiningu (CPUE)
— •  Visitala SMN (Biomass index SMN)
••
•
•
•
•
•L •
• • • /  \  /  \  
•  V  /  i f  1
\ : •* *• 1 * •1 * •1 • •
*• 1 • • • s  1• • • • • |• • * * 1
1 * •1 * •
V y . /• • • 4• •• • 1 A ;• / • V , .V/ \  A • 1I \  Vi • • j ’** A /
••
• I/'- \  J  /  ' \  V \ /
» ■ V  ' V  '  \  V. . .  • /  % / .
• .  \  \  /
\  *
■18
■12
tilS)a.O
39£B
'3
'gac
'S
16 H — . -  . . ______  7----------------------------------- 1-24
14 
12 
10 
8 
6 
4 
2 
0
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
A r  Year
Figure 3.14: Female lumpfish biomass indices from the groundfish survey (SMB) and gillnet 
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3.8 Tables
Table 3.1: Engagement of lumpfish survey respondents in other fisheries
F is h e ry
% o f  lu m p fis h  
fis h e rm e n
M o d e  %  in c o m e  
f ro m  fis h e rie s
L u m p fis h  o n ly 23 20
W ith  la rg e  b o a t 23 100
W ith  q u o ta -fre e  “ strandveidar”  season 27 60
W ith  s m a ll-b o a t IT Q 15 100
W ith  s m a ll-b o a t IT Q  and q u o ta -fre e  “ strandveidar”  season 13 60
Table 3.2: Survey response regarding lumpfish fishing participation
N u m b e r
T o ta l lu m p f is h  p e rm it  h o ld e rs  2013  
T o ta l lu m p f is h  b oa ts  th a t f is h e d  in  2013  
G e n era l s u rve y  response 
Total number respondents 
T hose  w h o  h a ve  e ve r fis h e d  lu m p fis h  
T o ta l n u m b e r 2013  lu m p f is h  p e rm it  h o ld e rs  
T hose  w ith  lu m p f is h  c re w  expe rie n ce
431
2 82
164
103 (6 3 %  o f  su rve y  resp o n d e n ts )
71 (4 3 %  o f  a c tiv e  lu m p f is h  boa ts in  2 0 1 3 ) 
23 (5 9 %  o f  those  w i th  c re w  e xp e rie n ce )
Table 3.3: Number of communities by population size with lumpfish permits in 2015 (data 
from Statistics Iceland 2016)
P o p u la tio n
#  o f  c o m m u n itie s  
w ith  2015  
lu m p f is h  p e rm its
U n d e r  50 8
5 0 -1 5 0 11
1 50-500 14
5 0 0 -1 0 0 0 11
1 0 0 0-5 0 0 0 9
O v e r  5000  (g re a te r c a p ita l area) 6
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Table 3.4: Top 10 lumpfish landing communities (data from Icelandic Directorate of 
Fisheries 2016).
Harbor Metric tons landed in 2015
Stykkisholmur 650
VopnafjorQur 488
Drangsnes 469
Raufarhofn 455
BakkafjorQur 428
SiglufjorQur 364
Husavik 353
Brjansl^kur 299
Kopasker 277
Skagastrond 224
Table 3.5: Top 10 lumpfish permit communities for 2015, standardized by population size 
(data from Icelandic Directorate of Fisheries 2016 and Statistics Iceland 2016).
Community 2015 # permits
2015 # permits per 100 
individuals over age 15
Drangsnes 10 17
BakkafjorQur 10 14
NorQurfjorQur, Gjogur & Djupavik 5 10
Kopasker 9 9
Arskogssandur 7 8
Raufarhofn 13 8
Grimsey 4 7
BorgarfjorQur eystri 4 5
PatreksfjorQur, HjarQarnes, B jansl^kur & BarQastrond 26 5
H6lmav^k 13 5
Table 3.6: Number of communities with lumpfish permits held and presence of landings
2007-2015.
Year
# communities with 
permits
# communities with 
landings
2015 55 49
2014 46 40
2013 55 45
2012 59 48
2011 63 48
2010 65 52
2009 57 42
2008 52 42
2007 47 19
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General Conclusion
The primary goal of this dissertation was to explore the impacts that specific management 
and governance structures can have on the individuals and communities that are so intimately 
linked to fisheries. This research has also explored the reverse: individuals and communities 
can and should also have important influence in the design of fisheries management, and data 
from the social sciences are an essential component in sustainable fisheries management and 
governance. This dissertation used methods from the social sciences and the theory of 
political ecology to address the inherently interdisciplinary topic of fisheries. While the 
methods came primarily from the discipline of anthropology, a major theme that connects all 
three chapters is the importance of the inclusion of social science data in fisheries 
management in an interdisciplinary way. Although this dissertation is not interdisciplinary in 
the sense that it generates new knowledge in both the natural and social sciences, it is an 
example of research that addresses the larger structural and political issues of how different 
disciplines are included in fisheries management and the implications of un-sustainable 
fisheries management that does not include social science data.
At the heart of the conflict in Icelandic fisheries are two separate issues. The first is 
the design of the specific management rules and regulations. Iceland’s ITQ system itself has 
created irreversible, long-term changes to rural coastal communities and fishing livelihoods, 
as economic goals tend to overshadow biological or social goals (Chapter 1). All three 
chapters described non-economic considerations such as community pride, family history, 
and identity present in small-scale fisheries and rural communities. Therefore, it is crucial to 
incorporate these social aspects in the design and operation of fisheries management systems.
The various negative social impacts of Iceland’s ITQ system were predicted by social 
scientists at the time of its implementation, yet Iceland continues to have very few policies 
aimed at protecting those more likely to suffer negative and unequal consequences from the 
ITQ system. At the same time, new rifts in communities created by attempts to rectify 
negative impacts of the ITQ system show the difficulty of changing management structures 
once certain aspects of ITQ systems take hold (Chapter 2). The continued conflicts in 
Icelandic culture over “who fisheries should be for” highlight the importance of paying 
careful attention to the details of fisheries management design and the value that prior social 
science research could have in the management process.
This research has shown that the same rules do not apply to large- and small-scale 
fisheries (Chapters 1, 2), and even the definition of small-scale fishermen varies by gear, 
percent of income from fisheries, community, and through the course of a lifetime (Chapters
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1, 2, 3). Fishing livelihoods therefore differ by individual, community, and fishery, so not all 
fishing livelihoods are equally impacted by implementation of particular fisheries 
management regimes (Chapters 1, 2). Similarly, access, particularly for the next generation, 
is a major theme running through this dissertation. Access to resources and flexibility over 
time ensure viable coastal communities and fishing livelihoods, and management scenarios 
that fail to take this into account are likely to exacerbate the decline of coastal communities 
(Chapter 3). Furthermore, this research described the complexity of factors affecting coastal 
communities today in addition to changes brought on by management policies. Economic 
fluctuations in markets (Chapter 3), environmental fluctuations, and social trends like 
migration (Chapter 2) all influence the daily realities of coastal communities and fishing 
livelihoods and can affect the long-term sustainability of any fisheries management regime.
The second major issue in Icelandic fisheries is the organization of the governance 
structure -  the political power arrangement that impacts how management rules are made and 
enforced. Rural communities and small-scale fishermen are disengaged from the governance 
structures, and these situations of unequal power can further impact the overall sustainability 
of fisheries (Chapters 1, 2). When local communities are disengaged from governance 
processes, the legitimacy of the governance system is devalued. Sustainable fisheries 
management is contingent upon multiple factors and is inherently connected with a flexible 
governance arrangement (Chapter 3) that encourages sustainable resource use along with 
principles of equity and human rights (Chapters 1, 2).
Results from this dissertation contribute to advancing theories from political ecology 
and participatory governance. In recent scholarship from both bodies of literature, power 
distribution is a key concept in understanding the outcomes of fisheries management (Fabinyi 
et al. 2015; Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2015; Breslow 2016). Natural resource management 
systems that do not address equity can undermine their own success. No fisheries governance 
or management system is perfect, but some value and enact the multiple goals of social 
equity, economic efficiency, and biological sustainability better than others. Participatory 
governance arrangements can create equitable platforms for discussion of management goals 
and allow for greater consideration of local interests, non-economic values, family and 
historical connections, and flexible livelihood strategies (Chapters 1, 3). The current volatile 
political situation in Icelandic fisheries, with large power imbalances and little consideration 
of small-scale fishing livelihoods, makes it difficult to develop new rules that positively 
influence the overall social, economic, and biological sustainability of Icelandic fisheries 
resources (Chapter 2). Theories from political ecology also address how conflicts are created
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or shift between stakeholders through specific management decisions and arrangements 
(Beitl 2012). In Iceland, new levels of conflict were formed through the creation of a new 
quota-free fishery that was intended to offset the loss of opportunity for new entrants and the 
consolidation and redistribution of fish landings and processing that arose following 
implementation of ITQ fisheries management (Chapter 2); this new source of conflict can in 
turn threaten the sustainability of fisheries.
In many ways, sustainability is ensured by not only the rules of the management 
system itself, but larger issues of governance design, stakeholder power, and national 
constitutional rights. Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to offer specific 
management recommendations, general suggestions for a more inclusive governance system 
in Iceland include the formation of formal stakeholder advisory bodies and a scientific 
committee made up of experts from both natural and social sciences. Equity issues in access 
to fish and representation in the governance process must play a larger part in the design of a 
truly sustainable fisheries system for Iceland. Understanding the interplay of social and 
environmental factors and their related management end-goals and governance process is 
crucial in supporting truly sustainable fisheries in complex marine socio-ecological systems 
where protecting the social and cultural dimensions of fisheries is as important as protecting 
the fisheries resources themselves.
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^slandi og um allan heim. Eg mun virda tima fcinn og reyna ad gera fcatttoku  ^fcessu verkefni eins 
audvelda og hregt er fyrir ^ig.
Trunadur:
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til ummrela fra fcer nema ad fcu veitir skriflegt leyfi til fcess. Upplysingarnar sem koma fram i verkefninu 
verda nyttar til birtingar, kynningar eda utgafu an ^ess ad tengja fcad vid nafn ^itt eda personu. Eg mun 
halda trunad vid fcid med ^vi ad numera upplysingarnar fra fcer svo enginn geti rakid fcrer til fcm.
Val um ad taka ^att:
Su ert ekki skuldbundinn til fcatttoku, fcu getur tekid fcatt og / eda hrett vid fcatttokuna hvenrer sem er  ^
vidtalinu eda eftir ^ad. Ef ^ u vilt ad eg fcurrki ut upptokuna eftir vidtalid mun eg audvitad gera fcad.
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Spurningar eda nanari upplysingar:
E f vilt spyrja einhvers nuna, endilega gerdu ^ad. E f vilt spyrja einhvers s^dar getur haft 
samband vid undirritadar:
Catherine Chambers
Doktorsnemi-University of Alaska Fairbanks
Serfradingur- Eekkingasetrid a Blonduosi
Arbraut 31
540 Blonduosi
Simi 453 6311
Gsm 849 3792
cat@mail.holar.is
Courtney Carothers 
Assistant Professor
School of Fisheries and Ocean Sciences 
University of Alaska Fairbanks 
+1 907-474-5329 
clcarothers@alaska.edu
E f hefur spurningar um rettindi sem ^atttakanda i rannsoknarverkefni getur haft samband vid:
University of Alaska Fairbanks Office o f Research Integrity +1-866-876-7800 eda fyirb@ uaf.edu.
Yfirlysing um sam^ykki:
Eg skil ^rer upplysingar sem her koma fram, spurningum minum hefur verid svarad og eg sam^ykki ad 
taka ^att i ^essari rannsokn. Eg hef fengid eintak af ^ essu eydubladi.
Dagsetning og undirskrift ^atttakanda
Nafn ^atttakanda
Dagsetning og nafn rannsakanda
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